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SHUCKING A PATENT: HOW A SIMPLE 
BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY  
LAW CAN BREAK THE SHELL OF  
PATENT PROTECTIONS 
Abstract: Best available technology laws attempt to force the utilization of the 
most efficient and environmentally friendly technology that is economically 
achievable for a regulated actor to implement. Sustainability and numerous envi-
ronmental benefits come from these laws. Although simple to create, the imple-
mentation of a best available technology law is difficult and the sought effects of 
it are unrealized due to vagueness, reliance on the regulated to change, and lack 
of specifics to ensure true compliance. Patent law adds to this problem due to the 
protections available to patent holders that grants them the power to exclude oth-
ers from utilizing their intellectual property. Thus, if the best available technolo-
gy is protected by a patent, the holder controls its use and anyone seeking to ex-
ploit the technology must obtain permission. Patent rights are normally absolute, 
allowing the holder full control over their intellectual property. A recent ruling in 
the Supreme Court, however, allows for a once protected patent to be utilized in 
certain scenarios by non-holders, breaking the total control and freeing the tech-
nology. This ruling can now allow for future best available technology laws that 
can force the use of the best available technology without being hindered by pa-
tent protections in all cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Archaeological evidence indicates that early man engaged in shellfishing 
over 150,000 years ago.1 In the United States, Native Americans harvested 
shellfish by hand and later utilized rakes and canoes to access deeper waters.2 
The amount of shellfish remains, discovered in previously inhabited precoloni-
al areas throughout New England, indicates the importance of shellfishing to 
the indigenous people and the extent to which it occurred.3 Since the arrival of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NMFS-NE-220, RE-
VIEW OF THE ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF DREDGING IN THE CULTIVATION AND HARVEST OF MOLLUS-
CAN SHELLFISH 3 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.]; Torben C. 
Rick & Jon M. Erlandson, Coastal Exploitation, 325 SCI. 952, 952 (Aug. 21, 2009). 
 2 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3; Clyde L. MacKenzie, Jr. et al., 
Quahogs in Eastern North America: Part 1, Biology, Ecology, and Historical Uses, 64 MARINE FISH-
ERIES REV. 1, 11 (2002); Rick & Erlandson, supra note 1, at 952. 
 3 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3; MacKenzie et al., supra note 2, at 
1, 11. 
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Europeans, harvesting has modernized and increased, starting with hand oper-
ated specialized rakes and tongs and developing to modern day dredges.4 
Dredges are large metal devices that function as seafloor rakes and are 
towed by fishing vessels to harvest shellfish.5 Dredges vary in design and size 
depending on the species of shellfish being harvested and the sediment within 
the area.6 These devices are attached to the end of a towing line and scrape the 
ocean floor to collect the target species.7 Dredges can be mechanical or hy-
draulic, with the latter utilizing pressurized water to enhance the performance 
of the device.8 Commercial fishermen utilize dredging because it is the most 
effective way to harvest shellfish from the ocean floor.9 Current dredges have 
the ability to collect over ninety percent of the shellfish from the area it covers, 
allowing fishermen to obtain large catches to sustain industry and market 
needs.10 
Dredging, however, is like a tornado passing through a town, causing sig-
nificant environmental harm to the organisms within its path and the ecology 
of areas where it occurs.11 Mortality among target shellfish can reach as high 
as ninety percent or more.12 There is also the potential for substantial shell 
breakage among those harvested or subjected to the device.13 Moreover, dredg-
                                                                                                                           
 4 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3. 
 5 See 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.08 (2018) (providing a definition). 
 6 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 5; C.M. HAWKINS, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF INSHORE HYDRAULIC CLAM DREDGES ON 
INSHORE AREA HABITAT WITH FOCUS ON LOBSTER HABITAT, FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA 1 
(2006), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.623.6835&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RW4S-8WL3]. Average hydraulic dredges weigh hundreds of pounds and measure 
over two feet in width. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 5. 
 9 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4–6 (indicating that dredging is 
highly efficient and the primary means by which commercial fisherman harvest shellfish). 
 10 Thomas L. Meyer et al., The Performance and Environmental Effects of a Hydraulic Clam 
Dredge, MARINE FISHERIES REV., Sept. 1981, at 14, 18; see NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD-
MIN., supra note 1, at 4–6 (discussing current dredge performance); Thomas Lampert, Note, Stopping 
Illegal Fishing and Seafood Fraudsters: The Presidential Task Force’s Plan on Tackling IUU Fishing 
and Seafood Fraud, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (2017) (discussing the high value of the seafood 
industry in the United States); Seafood & Human Health, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 
(Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ aquaculture/faqs/faq_seafood_health.html [https://perma.
cc/H4K2-VS2H] (stating that each American consumes about 15.8 pounds of seafood and shellfish 
per year, which is half of the USDA’s recommended amount). 
 11 See Ronald Goldberg et al., Effects of Hydraulic Shellfish Dredging on the Ecology of a Culti-
vated Clam Bed, 3 AQUACULTURE ENV’T INTERACTIONS 11, 11 (2012) (discussing the shellfish mor-
tality rates resulting from dredging); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19–20 (same). 
 12 Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19–20. 
 13 JEAN LAMBERT & PRICE GOUDREAU, PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW ENGLAND HYDRAULIC 
DREDGE FOR THE HARVEST OF STIMPSON’S SURF CLAMS, DEP’T OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANA-
DA 5 (1996), http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Library/197697.pdf. [https://perma.cc/4YWL-QA86]. Sub-
stantial shell breakage from dredging is important because of the environmental waste it causes and 
for the impact it has on the ecology of an area. See id. at 4–5 (discussing the shell breakage and effi-
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ing negatively impacts the ecology of an area physically, biologically, and 
chemically.14 As the device passes through an area, the ocean floor is altered 
leaving behind a trench and eliminating any natural structures or features.15 
Any present marine life, flora or fauna, is subjected to the same destruction 
directly and indirectly from post dredging effects.16 The effects also alter oxy-
gen levels, sediment nutrient quality, and other aspects of the natural habitat.17 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts regulates dredging in its waters in 
an attempt to mitigate the impact this shellfishing method has on the environ-
ment while still allowing the industry to operate.18 These restrictions, however, 
do not completely prevent the harm posed by dredging and no alternative de-
vice exists that can match the yield of current devices without the negative en-
vironmental impacts.19 An environmentally optimal device would be beneficial 
to all parties involved and therefore creating it should be an immediate goal.20 
This coincides with the goals of sustainability which strives to preserve 
natural resources.21 Sustainability principles aim to establish, monitor, and 
maintain conditions where humans and nature coexist harmoniously and with 
mutual benefit.22 By working to achieve this goal, nature and everything it 
provides will be available to the present population and future generations.23 
If a more sustainable dredging device were created, it would likely be pa-
tented and, therefore, would prevent anyone from freely utilizing the device 
                                                                                                                           
ciencies of dredges); infra notes 79–112 (discussing the physical and ecological effects of dredging on 
shellfish and their habitats). 
 14 Goldberg et al., supra note 11, at 12. 
 15 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–13. Dredges are destructive to 
the ocean floor. Id. As the device passes through an area, it destroys any natural sediment structures or 
formations on the ocean floor, unbeds any flora rooted in its path, and leaves a deep track mark behind 
that remains, further affecting the area. Id.; infra notes 93–112 and accompanying text. 
 16 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 17–18, 26; infra notes 93–112 and 
accompanying text (discussing the impact of dredging on flora and fauna). 
 17 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–13, 17–18, 24; infra notes 93–
112 and accompanying text (discussing the chemical and biological effects of dredging). 
 18 See DIV. OF MARINE FISHERIES, MARINE FISHERIES REGULATION SUMMARIES (2017), http://
www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dfg/dmf/commercialfishing/reg-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/U98X-FCKY] 
(summarizing the Division of Marine Fisheries regulations that govern the shellfish dredging industry). 
 19 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4–7 (discussing the technologies 
currently being used in the shellfish dredging industry); DIV. OF MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 18; 
Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19–20 (discussing the high shellfish mortality rates resulting from 
dredging). 
 20 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4–6 (discussing several nega-
tive environmental harms resulting from the dredging process). 
 21 See Learn About Sustainability, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www. epa.
gov/sustainability/learn-about-sustainability#what [https://perma.cc/5A4Y-UKVP] (discussing 
sustainability, its principles and goals, and its importance). 
 22 Id. Sustainability is a basic concept grounded on the simple principle that nature provides every-
thing that is needed to survive. Id. 
 23 Id. 
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even if it is environmentally optimal.24 A patent provides its holder with a great 
deal of property rights and protections.25 The most significant of which is the 
right to exclude others from using what is set forth in the patent.26 Should any-
one violate this right, the patent holder can bring an infringement suit with the 
ability to obtain damages and an injunction to cease all unpermitted use.27 
Thus, anyone who wishes to utilize the patent must receive permission or wait 
until the patent expires.28 
There are no state or federal patent laws that can force a patent holder to 
utilize their intellectual property.29 In the absence of any such law, local legis-
lation in the form of a best available technology law could be enacted to force 
the use of an environmentally optimal patent.30 Best available technology laws 
set a standard for an industry to utilize the best technology within their opera-
tions that is economically achievable.31 If certain conditions are met, the envi-
ronmentally optimal patent could be deemed the best technology and become 
the industry standard.32 
This Note argues that unutilized environmentally optimal patents can be 
pushed into use by inducing or indirectly forcing the granting of licenses 
through the enactment of a best available technology law.33 Part I sets forth 
and explains the current laws and regulations that govern shellfishing in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.34 Part II details the environmental impact of 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012); infra notes 125–159 and accompanying text (analyzing pa-
tent laws and policy). 
 25 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); see id. § 261 (stating the ownership and assignment rights of a patent 
holder). 
 26 See id. § 154(a)(1) (setting forth a patent holder’s right to exclude others from utilizing their 
intellectual property). 
 27 Id. §§ 154(a)(1), 271, 281, 283–284. 
 28 See id. § 261 (stating that holders may assign property rights to the patent); Types of Patents, 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
patdesc.htm [https://perma.cc/3AEE-MYQS] (explaining patent durations by type). 
 29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (reserving patent law for Congress). See generally 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–390 (omitting any forcing provisions in the federal regulation of patents). 
 30 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (2012) (utilizing a best available technology standard to set per-
formance requirements); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/eg/learn-about-effluent-guidelines [https://perma.cc/Q6FF-8CV2] (summarizing 
best available technology laws); infra notes 240–266 and accompanying text (discussing best availa-
ble technology laws). 
 31 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard to set performance 
requirements); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (describing the effect of best available 
technology laws). 
 32 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard); Learn About Efflu-
ent Guidelines, supra note 30 (describing the factors considered in determining what is the best avail-
able technology for the standard); infra notes 240–266 and accompanying text (discussing best availa-
ble technology laws). 
 33 See infra notes 267–352 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 38–74 and accompanying text. 
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current dredging technology and the value it provides the industry.35 Part III 
provides legal background to the law surrounding this scenario and focuses on 
patent, antitrust, monopoly, and best available technology laws.36 Finally, Part 
IV introduces an unused hypothetical environmentally optimal patent and dis-
cusses the enactment of a best available technology law to achieve its use.37 
I. BACKGROUND OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW GOVERNING  
COMMERCIAL SHELLFISHING 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its agencies perform a great 
number of duties to protect all of the wildlife contained within the state’s bor-
der.38 Section A discusses the numerous laws and regulations that shellfisher-
man need to follow to ensure their day to day operations are compliant.39 Sec-
tion B covers additional laws specifically targeting dredges and dredging that 
also impact operations.40 
A. Massachusetts Fish and Game Laws 
The Massachusetts Department of Fish and Game (“DFG”) is an agency 
under Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs.41 
The DFG is responsible for the preservation and protection of the Common-
wealth’s marine and freshwater fisheries, wildlife species, plants, natural 
communities, and habitats.42 The DFG also works to uphold and enforce 
Amendment 49 of the Massachusetts Constitution, which sets out the rights of 
the people to the environment and natural resources.43 The agency is divided 
into four divisions, including the Division of Marine Fisheries (“DMF”), 
which is responsible for the conservation of marine fisheries resources 
throughout the Commonwealth.44 The DMF controls and manages recreational 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See infra notes 75–119 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 120–266 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 267–352 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 41–74 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 41–57 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 58–74 and accompanying text. 
 41 About the Department of Fish & Game, ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS (2018), http://www.
mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/about/ [https://perma.cc/NA34-8HH5]. 
 42 Id. 
 43 MASS. CONST. amend. 49 (“The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom 
from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their 
environment; and the protection of the people in their right to the conservation, development and 
utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other natural resources is hereby declared 
to be a public purpose.”); About the Department of Fish & Game, supra note 41. 
 44 About the Department of Fish & Game, supra note 41. The other three divisions are the Divi-
sion of Ecological Restoration, the Office of Fishing and Boating Access, and the Division of Fisher-
ies and Wildlife. Id. The Division of Ecological Restoration protects and restores rivers, wetlands, and 
watersheds throughout the Commonwealth for the benefit of the people and all wildlife. Id. The Office 
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and commercial harvesting of fish, shellfish, and crustaceans.45 Within its role, 
the DMF strives to promote sustainability while balancing Massachusetts’ ex-
pansive fishing industry.46 
The DMF sets out rules and regulations that govern how commercial 
fisherman may harvest shellfish and other aquatic organisms.47 In order to fish 
Massachusetts’ waters, each commercial fisherman must obtain a license or 
permit from the DMF.48 The DMF also determines annual open seasons for 
each species, providing a timeframe for lawful harvesting.49 Additionally, the 
rules set the possession limits that range from daily allotted amounts and hour-
ly limits, to total pounds per season.50 Further, there are also size requirements 
for each species, setting a minimum length, width, combination of measure-
                                                                                                                           
of Fishing and Boating Access provides and maintains boat and canoe access sites to the various water 
sources of the Commonwealth and works jointly with the Department of Fish & Game to obtain 
easements, design access points, and facilitate operations. Id. The Division of Fisheries and Wildlife 
(“DFW”) is responsible for the conservation, restoration, protection, and management of fish and 
wildlife resources throughout the state. Id. The DFW’s effort balances the needs of the people and 
nature to protect the resources under its protection and ensure their availability for all future genera-
tions. Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.; Division of Marine Fisheries Mission Statement, ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS (2017), 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/dmf/mission-statement.html [https://perma.cc/KG2K-FQQM] 
(“Mission Statement: To manage the Commonwealth’s living marine resources in balance with the 
environment resulting in sustainable fisheries and contributions to our economy, stable availability of 
diverse, healthy seafood and enriched opportunities that support our coastal culture.”). 
 47 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 1A (2018). 
 48 Id. § 1 (defining “fish” as any wildlife that inhabits the ocean or connected waters and includes, 
all crustacean or marine fish, that may swim or move freely, as well as any shellfish or sea worms); id. 
§ 80 (stating that no person can fish or take fish for commercial purposes from any waters in the 
Commonwealth unless they are issued a state commercial fishing permit individually or upon a vessel 
that has been issued a permit); 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.01(2) (2018) (detailing commercial fishing 
permits and required information); id. 7.01(4) (detailing additional commercial fishing permit re-
quirements, special permit requirements, and endorsement requirements if applicable). Most are ob-
tained through an application process from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 322 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 7.01(5) (setting out the application process requirements); Massachusetts Commercial Fish-
ing Permits, ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS (2017), http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/dmf/
commercial-fishing/fishing-permits/ [https://perma.cc/U47N-JBZ4] (detailing Massachusetts com-
mercial fishing permit and endorsement types). 
 49 See 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.01–.15 (Detailing specific restrictions for the annual season, 
area restrictions, timeframe restrictions, and rules for specific areas); Commercial Regulations Tables, 
ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS (2017), http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/dmf/laws-and-
regulations/commercial-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/CGA9-H3YX] (detailing the timeframe 
for lawful harvesting and seasons). 
 50 See 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.05(3) (limiting Atlantic Sea Scallop fisherman to 200 pounds of 
shucked meat or 2,000 pounds in shell at any time); id. 6.08(3)(a) (limiting Surf Clam harvesting to 
200 bushels per twenty-four hours and 400 bushels per forty-eight hours); id. 6.08(4)(a) (limiting 
Ocean Quahog harvesting to 836 bushels per twenty-four hours); id. 6.36(3) (limiting Quahog harvest-
ing to forty bushels per twenty-four hours). 
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ments, or other specific characteristics.51 Municipalities may also add in addi-
tional requirements that apply in their local waters.52 Additionally, local gov-
erning bodies control where commercial fishing may occur and have the ability 
to designate certain waters as conservation, protected, and contaminated are-
as.53 Multiple factors influence what areas are open to fishermen.54 Sustaina-
bility and public health serve as the basis for most regulations.55 In general, the 
DMF does a great deal to protect its wildlife by issuing a wide variety of con-
trols and regulations to ensure sustainability, healthy populations, and the sur-
vival of local species.56 Fishermen must comply with each and every applica-
ble regulation or face consequences that can include fines, permit revocation, 
vessel impoundment, criminal charges, and other costly punishments.57 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. 6.05(2) (requiring Atlantic Sea Scallops to be at a minimum 3.5 inches in diameter from 
the hinge to the outer edge); id. 6.08(3)(c) (requiring ninety-five percent of harvested Surf Clams per 
batch to be larger than five inches in the longest shell diameter); id. 6.11(2) (requiring harvested Bay 
Scallops to have a well-defined raised annual growth line that measures at least ten millimeters from 
the hinge of the shell); id. 6.20(2)(a) (requiring that Quahogs be larger than one inch in shell thickness 
or hinge width); id. 6.20(2)(b) (requiring that Soft Shelled Clams be larger than two inches in area of 
longest diameter); id. 6.20(2)(c) (requiring that Oysters be larger than three inches in area of longest 
diameter). 
 52 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 54 (stating that municipalities may create, issue, and enforce 
local restrictions on shellfish harvesting in waters under their control that add or expand on state laws 
and regulations); id. § 56 (stating that state agencies and the agencies of municipalities shall work 
jointly and cooperatively to enforce and uphold all laws and regulations governing waters controlled 
by more than one governmental body). 
 53 Id. §§ 54, 56; 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.01–.15 (detailing several restrictions for specific 
areas and locations). 
 54 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 20 (stating that the DMF shall assist and cooperate with 
municipalities to increase the supply and population of shellfish which includes the extermination or 
incapacitation of causes of harm within the municipality’s jurisdiction); 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 
16.04 (stating that efforts to protect and increase shellfish populations, such as restrictions on com-
mercial and recreational harvesting, are a cooperative effort between the Commonwealth and munici-
palities which is guided by many factors that include public health and shellfish sustainability). 
 55 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 20 (focusing on sustainability); 322 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 4.01–.15 (detailing several restrictions for public health purposes); id. 16.04 (supporting sus-
tainability and public health). 
 56 See 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.01–16.06 (setting forth DMF regulations). 
 57 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 9 (stating that any law enforcement agency with the jurisdiction 
to enforce any law or regulation related to marine fisheries of any kind may conduct warrantless 
searches and arrests in their enforcement efforts and may seize any container, storage device, motor 
vehicle, boat, vessel, or fish related to a violation); id. § 13 (stating that law enforcement may demand 
for the ability to inspect any fish in the possession of any person believed to have violated any marine 
fisheries law, and may arrest or fine that person for refusal or violation); id. § 17 (stating the wide 
range of powers provided to the director of marine fisheries to enforce and create regulations); id. 
§ 67 (stating that the taking of shellfish from licensed grounds or beds without consent may lead to 
fines and imprisonment); id. § 68 (stating that digging, taking, or carrying away shellfish from waters 
at night may lead to fines and imprisonment); id. § 72 (stating that violating a catch limit may lead to 
a fine and imprisonment); id. § 75 (stating that shellfishing in restricted areas without permission may 
lead to fines and imprisonment). 
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B. Dredging Laws and Regulations 
The Division of Marine Fisheries also regulates dredges which are used 
by commercial fisherman to harvest various kinds of shellfish.58 Dredges are 
large metal devices which function as seafloor rakes that are towed by fishing 
vessels and use blades, knives, or teeth to dig into the ocean floor to harvest 
shellfish.59 Mechanical and hydraulic versions exist, with the latter utilizing 
pressurized water to enhance the performance of the device.60 Starting in the 
1950s, hydraulic dredges became the primary devices used in the cultivation of 
shellfish.61 
The Division of Marine Fisheries regulates commercial dredging by re-
quiring permits that come with restrictions, reporting requirements, gear re-
strictions, and other species-specific rules.62 Specific permit types are differen-
tiated by vessel size, with larger vessels paying more to secure their right to 
operate the dredge.63 Permit cost is also affected by the applicant’s residence, 
with non-residents paying double for the same license.64 Before a permit is 
valid, an applicant may also need to obtain certain endorsements and sign-offs 
from local municipalities and other agencies.65 Permitted commercial fisher-
man must also abide by the reporting rules and regulations of Massachusetts.66 
All shellfish must be tagged at the time of harvest, and the tag must contain the 
permit holder’s name and permit number, date and time of harvest, shellfish 
type and quantity, and state of harvest and growing area information.67 
                                                                                                                           
 58 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.06, 4.10, 6.08, 6.36. 
 59 See id. 6.08 (defining “Dredge” and “Dredging”). Dredges can vary in design and size depend-
ing on the type of shellfish being harvested. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, 
at 4. 
 60 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 5. Mechanical dredges are attached 
to the end of a line and scrape the ocean floor to collect target species in a chain or mesh bag. Id. at 4. 
Hydraulic dredges function in the same way, but highly pressurized water is used to blast the ocean 
floor to loosen the sediment and the species within, making it easier for the dredge to collect its target 
as it is towed. Id. at 5. There are various types of dredges used throughout the United States which 
include hydraulic escalators, shallow water clam kicking, and hydraulic suction dredges. Id. at 4. 
 61 Id. at 5. Average hydraulic dredges weigh approximately 450 to 900 pounds and measure 24 to 
40 inches in width. Id. 
 62 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.06, 4.10, 6.08, 6.36. 
 63 Application for Commercial Saltwater Fishing Permits, DIV. OF MARINE FISHERIES, 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. (2017), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dfg/dmf/commercialfishing/
commapp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VTP-VNAG]. 
 64 Id. 
 65 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, §§ 54, 56; 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.10; Application for Com-
mercial Saltwater Fishing Permits, supra note 63. 
 66 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 21 (making it illegal to falsify or underreport required infor-
mation pertaining to harvesting yields). 
 67 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03. 
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Dredges are also regulated by the type of species being harvested.68 De-
pending on the type of shellfish, a specific fencing size will be required.69 Fur-
ther, some specie specific regulations dictate the permitted size and width of 
the mechanism and limit the number of dredges that may be used at one time 
per vessel.70 The hydraulic pump, which blasts the pressurized water, is regu-
lated as well.71 Specific firing distances between the dredge and the pump are 
set by specie along with its maximum power in gallons per minute.72 This 
spacing and pressure control determines the force that is exerted on the shell-
fish and ocean floor.73 Controlling the amount of force exerted on the shellfish 
protects shellfish from being severely injured or fatally damaged.74 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF SHELLFISH DREDGING,  
VALUE OF THE PRACTICE, AND THE NEED FOR A NEW  
ENVIRONMENTALLY OPTIMAL DEVICE 
Shellfish dredging negatively impacts a harvested area tremendously and 
affects the local environment as well.75 Section A discusses how shellfish are 
directly affected, details the extremely high mortality and damage rates caused 
by dredging, and explains the increased exposure to other harms that are exac-
erbated by the passing of a dredge.76 Section B covers the harm caused to the 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. 4.10, 6.08, 6.36. 
 69 Id. 4.10(3)(a) (requiring a specific fencing size for a dredge). Fencing here is referring to the 
walls or outer area of the cage or collection bag of a dredge where lawfully harvestable shellfish are 
held. See id. (describing required “ring” sizes for a dredge); Elizabeth Brown, Fishing Gear 101: 
Dredges—The Bottom Scrappers, SAFINA CTR. (June 6, 2016), http://safinacenter.org/2015/05/
fishing-gear-101-dredges-the-bottom-scrapers/ [https://perma.cc/AB8F-L8M2] (describing dredges 
and how they function). These holding mechanisms are lined with fencing of a certain size that allows 
lawfully sized targeted shellfish to remain while all others filter and fall through to remain in the 
ocean. See 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.10(3), 6.08 (detailing dredge regulations); Brown, supra (de-
scribing dredges and related functions). 
 70 322 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.10(2) (stating that it is unlawful to operate or possess a scallop 
dredge, or combination of scallop dredges, that is wider that ten feet in the waters of the Common-
wealth); id. 6.08(3)(b) (stating that it is unlawful for any vessel to operate a hydraulic dredge that is 
wider than forty-eight inches or more than one dredge while harvesting surf clams); id. 6.08(4)(b) 
(stating that it is unlawful for any vessel to operate any hydraulic dredge wider than forty-eight inches 
or more than one dredge while harvesting ocean quahogs); id. 6.36(5) (stating that it is unlawful for 
any vessel to operate any hydraulic dredge wider than forty-eight inches or more than one dredge 
while harvesting quahogs). 
 71 Id. 6.08(3)(b)(3). 
 72 Id. (stating that it is unlawful to operate a dredge to harvest surf clams in the waters of Chat-
ham, Massachusetts unless it is hydraulic, with a maximum width of sixteen inches, and a three inch 
or smaller pump at a ten-foot head with a maximum power of 300 gallons per minute). 
 73 Id. 
 74 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 5 (discussing the effects of pressure 
and forces from dredging operations on shellfish). 
 75 See infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 79–92 and accompanying text. 
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ecology of an area by detailing the physical, chemical, and biological altera-
tions dredging causes that may subside after a small period of time or remain 
indefinitely.77 Although harmful, Section C shows that this practice remains 
the most effective commercial option, but the introduction of an environmen-
tally optimal device can change this situation.78 
A. Impact on Shellfish 
Although certain regulations exist to protect shellfish, dredging results in 
potentially significant mortality and damage rates.79 Dredge mortality and 
damage is caused from the device cutting or crushing the target species.80 Nu-
merous studies vying to measure the impact of dredging on these rates have 
resulted in a wide range of findings.81 Mortality rates range from seven percent 
to ninety-two percent, and figures increase once the device fills while harvest-
ing.82 Damage rates range from under ten percent to over fifty percent.83 This 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See infra notes 93–112 and accompanying text. 
 78 See infra notes 113–119 and accompanying text. 
 79 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 17 (discussing that dredge mortali-
ty is also caused from other impacts from the gear, pressure inside the collection device, surface anox-
ia, and complications from exposure to certain temperatures); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19. 
 80 Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19. 
 81 See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (discussing mortality and damage test results 
from dredging activities). 
 82 Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 20; LAMBERT & GOUDREAU, supra note 13, at 7. One study 
consisting of two tows of a hydraulic dredge targeting clams beneath the ocean floor resulted in these 
types of mortalities. Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 20. The two tows utilized different dredge settings 
and setups. Id. The first tow resulted in an eighteen percent mortality rate for small clams and an 
eighty-three percent mortality rate for large clams. Id. This rate increased after the dredge had filled 
within the first ten meters to twenty-six and ninety-two percent respectively. Id. Among the mortali-
ties, it is estimated that sixty percent had been crushed and the remainder had been cut. Id. One bushel 
of the entire catch showed none of the large clams had been damaged, but about fifteen percent of 
small clams were damaged. Id. The second tow resulted in a seventeen percent mortality rate for small 
clams and a seven percent mortality rate for large clams. Id. This rate increased after the first ten me-
ters to twenty-eight and thirty percent respectively. Id. Among the mortalities, calculations estimated 
that eighty-five percent had been crushed and the remaining fifteen percent had been cut. Id. In a sam-
ple bushel of the harvest, eighteen percent of large clams and twenty-one percent of small clams were 
damaged. Id. Other tests resulted with some sample sites with a near 100% mortality rate for clams of 
a retainable size. LAMBERT & GOUDREAU, supra note 13, at 7. 
 83 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 59–78; LAMBERT & GOUDREAU, 
supra note 13, at 5; J.H. MANNING, THE MARYLAND SOFTSHELL CLAM INDUSTRY AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON THE TIDEWATER RESOURCES, MD. DEP’T OF RES. & EDUC. RES. STUDY 5 (1957), http://aquatic
commons.org/6775/1/57-14.pdf. [https://perma.cc/SDF5-N6EZ]. A study attempting to determine the 
efficiency of hydraulic dredges resulted in a finding that less than ten percent of surf clams, fifty per-
cent of razor clams, and less than twenty-five percent of northern propeller and truncated soft-shell 
clams are damaged due to the device. LAMBERT & GOUDREAU, supra note 13, at 5. Other studies 
have resulted in lower figures. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 59–78. For 
example, one study resulted in findings of about one percent shell breakage for the harvested shellfish. 
Id. at 61. Another study reported a one to four percent rate of shell breakage of oysters in the harvest. 
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wide range of mortality and damage rates indicates that the current dredging 
practices are unable to account for the various habitat and sea floor conditions 
that may directly affect the efficiency of each harvest.84 
In addition to directly killing many shellfish in the dredging process, 
dredging also leads to an increase in predation mortality.85 Towing the dredge 
along the ocean floor leaves behind a track.86 Predators are normally active in 
dredging areas, but the activity increases after the device passes through, spe-
cifically within the dredge’s track.87 Shellfish that are exposed and brought to 
the surface of the ocean floor by the device are left unprotected and open to 
predators, further exacerbating shellfish mortality.88 This increase in predation 
occurs within hours of a dredge passing and activity rates return to normal af-
ter about twenty-four hours.89 
Only some shellfish exposed to predation after a dredge passes are able to 
rebury themselves back below the sediment for protection.90 The density of the 
sediment in the area, other environmental aspects, and temperature also factors 
into the probability of success.91 Shellfish, however, are also resilient and can 
repair themselves after sustaining non-fatal damage from dredging.92 
                                                                                                                           
MANNING, supra, at 5. Finally, a third study determined that clams suffered from a breakage rate 
seven to ten percent. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 63. 
 84 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 59–78 (listing studies and 
findings); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 20 (discussing mortality rates); LAMBERT & GOUDREAU, 
supra note 13, at 5 (discussing a wide range of mortality and damage rates in various harvesting areas 
on comparable species); MANNING, supra note 83, at 5 (discussing damage rates and efficiencies). 
 85 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 22; Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 
21. Predation mortality means the rate of mortality caused by the efforts of predators. See NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 22 (discussing predation mortality); Meyer et al., 
supra note 10, at 21 (discussing predation mortality). Predation is defined as “a relation between ani-
mals in which one organism captures and feeds on others.” Predation, DICTIONARY.COM (Feb. 10, 
2018), http://www.dictionary.com/browse/predation [https://perma.cc/VNY6-G8E2]. 
 86 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 22; Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 21. 
 87 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 22; Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 21. 
 88 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 22; Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 21. 
 89 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 22; Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 21. 
 90 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 23. The size of the specific shell-
fish relates to how fast it will be able to complete this task. Id. Studies have shown that larger shellfish 
rebury at a slower pace compared to smaller ones. Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 17. For example, oysters can rapidly heal from minor shell damage and abrasions. Id. 
Some species of shellfish are stronger than others, allowing them to suffer less damage. NAT’L OCE-
ANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 17. Shell strength and resilience, however, cannot 
completely protect any species from the effects of dredging. See id. (discussing these qualities but still 
detailing high rates of damage and mortality); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 20 (discussing these 
shellfish attributes). 
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B. Impact on the Ecology of a Dredged Area 
The ecology of an area is negatively affected after it is dredged.93 After a 
device is towed through, there can be significant physical, biological, and 
chemical effects.94 The impact is dependent on the length of the operation, in-
tensity, and the amount of area covered.95 
Dredges leave behind tracks due to the dragging of the device on the 
ocean floor.96 The depth and width of the tracks vary and remain until natural 
processes restore the sediment that has been displaced.97 As the device passes 
it also disrupts the sediment’s composition, as well as forming plumes and in-
creasing turbidity.98 This has a direct effect on sediment and water quality that 
affects the surrounding area.99 Although these effects can naturally subside, 
local organisms can be harmed by a reduction in visibility and oxygen lev-
els.100 The dredge also affects the surface of the ocean floor by changing its 
natural quality and topography by erasing physical structures, burrows, subsur-
face contents, and other natural features.101 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Goldberg et al., supra note 11, at 11. The ecology of an area refers to the relationship between 
an areas living organisms and the natural environment they inhabit and rely upon. See Ecology, EN-
CYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/science/ecology [https://
perma.cc/4GQJ-WVV7] (defining and discussing ecology). 
 94 Goldberg et al., supra note 11, at 12. Dredging operations cause chemical and biological altera-
tions to an area. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 16–30. Organisms that 
live on the seafloor that are removed, harmed, or killed by the passing of a device are vital to the ar-
ea’s ecology. See id. at 28. (discussing the impact of dredging on the ecology of an area and specific 
affects it has on local organisms’ survivability). Many contribute to the natural sediment and water 
recycling process that regulates chemical levels, mixes and maintains sediment quality, and sustains 
proper oxygen levels. Id. Therefore, mass removal can disrupt the area’s biochemistry. Id. Biochemis-
try is important to ecology and affects vital aspects such as nutrient quality and the environments 
habitability. Id. 
 95 Goldberg et al., supra note 11, at 12. 
 96 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. Turbidity is a measurement or observation of how diluted water is as a result of foreign 
sediment, bacteria, chemicals, or other items. Turbidity Measurement, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (1996), 
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/emergencies/fs2_33.pdf [https://perma.cc/S83V-
WRWP] (discussing turbidity). A simple example can be seen in comparing clear water and water 
mixed with dirt, the latter which being cloudy and diluted. See id. (comparing a muddy river to a fresh 
water spring to illustrate turbidity). 
 99 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 12 (discussing the suspension of 
sediment in dredged area water and turbidity and its harmful effects); ROBERT B. RHEAULT, REVIEW 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT IMPACTS RELATED TO THE MECHANICAL HARVEST OF CULTURED SHELLFISH, 
CASHIN ASSOCS. 12–13 (July 11, 2008), http://www.ecsga.org/Pages/Sustainability/Rheault%20
EIS%20dredge%20impacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX8Q-FY6N] (discussing the effect of dredging on 
sediment and water quality). 
 100 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 12, 17 (detailing the impact of 
dredging on an area and the resulting harms it causes flora and fauna in the affected area). 
 101 Id. at 13. 
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These physical effects have the potential to severely impact marine organ-
isms.102 Turbidity can disrupt a variety of organisms, including those that rely 
on sight to feed, the productivity of macroscopic benthic organisms, and plank-
ton that rely on photosynthesis.103 It can also affect the respiration of organ-
isms by causing hypoxia, anoxia, and gill clogging.104 The variety and abun-
dance of area organisms can be negatively impacted as well due to the combi-
nation of disruptions.105 
Dredging in seagrass habitats is currently restricted by state and federal 
law.106 Other aquatic vegetation, however, is susceptible to the impact of 
dredging and is harmed as a result.107 Dredging has been compared to the 
plowing of plants on land because of its similar outcomes.108 Every form of 
aquatic flora in the device’s path is highly likely to be harmed or destroyed.109 
Additionally, the utilization of highly pressurized water has the ability to up-
root, destroy, and displace vegetation as well.110 Flora that is away from the 
affected area is still negatively impacted by turbidity because it can block any 
light from reaching the seafloor, therefore stalling or preventing vital photo-
synthesis activity.111 Overall, dredging causes short term and long term effects 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 17. 
 103 Id. Benthic organisms live on and beneath the ocean floor and are vital to the ecology of an area. 
See Aquatic Life: Benthic Organisms, BATIQUITOS LAGOON FOUND. (2011), http://www.batiquitos
foundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Factsheet_Benthic.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER3Q-P9MK] 
(discussing benthic organisms). Without their natural presence in an area, food chains are disrupted, 
harmfully affecting others in the chain. See id. (discussing the importance of benthic organisms). 
 104 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 105 See id. (discussing how the harmful effects of dredging can lead to an area being deadly or unin-
habitable for certain organisms); MITCHELL TARNOWSKI, A LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE ECOLOGICAL 
EFFECTS OF HYDRAULIC ESCALATOR DREDGING, FISHERIES TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 6–7 (2006), 
http://ecsga.org/Pages/Sustainability/Tarnowski2001(rev2006).pdf [https://perma.cc/WU5P-LTLJ] (dis-
cussing how dredging can move or bury vital sources of materials needed for shelters or nests). 
 106 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 26. Seagrass is protected because 
of the vital purpose it serves as a habitat and for the ecology of an area. See Seagrass Bed, OCEANA 
(Feb. 11, 2018), http://oceana.org/marine-life/marine-science-and-ecosystems/seagrass-bed [https://
perma.cc/P6QM-T4MP] (discussing the importance of seagrass). This flora forms beds that are essen-
tial for the survival of certain organisms. See id. (detailing that seagrass beds provide shelter, protec-
tion, refuge, and sources of food). 
 107 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 26. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See id. (comparing the effect of dredging on aquatic flora to plowing a field on land); S.J.M. 
Blaber et al., Effects of Fishing on the Structure and Functioning of Estuarine and Nearshore Ecosys-
tems, 57 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 590, 596 (2000) (sharing a similar comparison for seagrass beds). 
 110 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 26. The highly pressurized water 
comes from nozzles attached to hydraulic dredges that work to blast the ocean floor and loosen sedi-
ment to aid in the harvesting of shellfish. Goldberg et al., supra note 11, at 12. The pressure utilized to 
accomplish this varies on the sediment of the area and the species targeted. Id. The proper power 
needs to be used to ensure that the dredge can harvest the shellfish in the area while not destroying 
them in the process. Id. 
 111 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 26; MICHAEL C. BARNETTE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NMFS-SEFSC-449, A REVIEW OF 
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that may naturally subside or persist depending on the intensity of the im-
pact.112 
C. Value of Dredging and the Need for an Environmentally Optimal Dredge 
Commercial dredging is the most effective way to harvest shellfish from 
the ocean floor.113 Current dredges have the ability to collect over ninety per-
cent of the shellfish within a track.114 This process allows fisherman to obtain 
large catches to sustain industry needs and meet market requirements.115 End-
ing this practice would harm the shellfishing industry and leave fisherman with 
inefficient and ineffective options to continue shellfishing commercially.116 
A new process or device to commercially harvest shellfish that mitigates 
or removes the impact of current dredging operations would substantially ben-
efit the environment.117 If this technology was available, its immediate use 
would be targeted by everyone involved.118 If patented, however, the holder 
                                                                                                                           
THE FISHING GEAR UTILIZED WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST REGION AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON 
ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT 4 (Feb. 2001); Turbidity, NOAA OCEAN SERV. EDUC. (July 6, 2017), 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/estuaries/media/supp_estuar10e_turbinity.html [https://
perma.cc/RYC6-SPNM] (discussing turbidity’s negative effect on organisms dependent on photosyn-
thesis to survive, and the additional negative effect to the food chain due to its impact). 
 112 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (discussing the physical, 
biological, and chemical impact dredging has on an area and the length of time needed for the harm to 
the area to revert to previous natural conditions). 
 113 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4–6 (discussing the history 
and development of shellfish harvesting); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the high effi-
ciency of current dredges at ninety percent); How Seafood Is Harvested, J.J. MCDONNELL (2017), 
http://www.jjmcdonnell.com/product-information/harvesting [https://perma.cc/8ECC-PE4C] (illustrat-
ing and explaining shellfish dredging). 
 114 Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18; see NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, 
at 4–6 (discussing dredges and methods of shellfish harvesting); Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 
(stating that each American consumes about 15.8 pounds of seafood and shellfish per year). 
 115 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4–6 (discussing the perfor-
mance of dredges); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the high efficiency of current dredg-
es); Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 (stating that each American consumes about 15.8 
pounds of seafood and shellfish per year). 
 116 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 4–6 (discussing the perfor-
mance of dredges); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18 (discussing the high efficiency of current dredg-
es); Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 (detailing levels of U.S. seafood consumption). 
 117 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (detailing the harms of 
dredging); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19–20 (discussing shellfish mortality rates from dredging). 
 118 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (discussing the harms 
of dredging to the environment which impact harvestable shellfish); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 
19–20 (discussing shellfish mortality rates from dredging which shows the loss of potentially harvest-
able shellfish); Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 (detailing levels of U.S. seafood consump-
tion). 
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would have no obligation to introduce it into the market or utilize its benefits 
because of intellectual property rights.119 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part provides an overview of four different areas of law that are vital 
to the argument made in this Note.120 Patent law is vital to this Note’s argu-
ment and is covered in Section A with an overview of patents, the rights con-
veyed to the holder, protections, and the policies behind the system within the 
United States.121 Patents, however, do not automatically prevent unauthorized 
utilization of the intellectual property they contain, any such activity needs to 
be acted upon through an infringement suit detailed in Section B.122 Section C 
covers Monopoly and antitrust law, focusing on the relation between this topic 
and patents.123 Finally, Section D explains best available technology laws, 
providing an overview of these standard setting mandates.124 
A. Patent Law 
Technological advancements, inventions, and innovations have brought 
about the modern world and continue to propel mankind into the future.125 In-
ventors come forward and introduce their creations into the public and offer its 
uses and benefits to everyone.126 The inventors are also free to demand their 
own benefits in exchange.127 
The invention alone, however, is open to theft, copying, and unauthorized 
reproduction.128 To prevent this outcome, inventors and creators may apply for 
and be granted a patent on their inventions, which provides them with several 
rights and protections.129 In the United States, the Federal Government pro-
                                                                                                                           
 119 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (setting forth a patent holders rights which does not include 
any duty to utilize the protected intellectual property); id. § 261 (stating that patents are treated as 
personal property). 
 120 See infra notes 125–274 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 125–212 and accompanying text. 
 122 See infra notes 160–212 and accompanying text. 
 123 See infra notes 213–247 and accompanying text. 
 124 See infra notes 248–274 and accompanying text. 
 125 See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533–34 (1870) (stating that patents provide 
holders with personal property and exclusion rights which ensure that an inventor’s work and ingenui-
ty is protected from free utilization so that they can benefit from their labor while simultaneously 
promoting progress in science and arts for the publics benefit). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:3 (2d ed. 
2016) (discussing how others may freely copy one’s invention without repercussion). Without any 
protections, an inventor’s work, efforts, and ideas can be swept away, potentially leaving the innova-
tor with nothing. See id. (discussing the value patent rights provide to a holder). 
 129 Id. § 1:4. 
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vides this protection, and the power to grant these rights is enshrined in the 
United States Constitution.130 When a patent is issued, the government grants 
the inventor numerous protections for a limited time, including full property 
rights and the power to exclude.131 Through exclusion, the inventor can pre-
vent anyone from using their patented invention.132 Therefore, when the inven-
tor goes public with their work, using it as they see fit, no one can lawfully 
copy, reproduce, or utilize the invention without permission.133 
Although a patent provides its holder with a great deal of protections and 
benefits, in exchange, the holder must publicly disclose their work in its entire-
ty.134 In the patent application, the invention is detailed providing the knowledge 
needed for others to utilize the idea.135 Essentially, a patent is an incentive to 
disclose, which provides the inventor with a monopoly on their work for a lim-
ited time.136 However, when the time period expires, the disclosed invention is 
freed to the public domain, allowing unrestricted use without any recourse that 
could have been brought when the patent was active.137 
This exchange benefits both the inventor and the public by creating a bal-
ance that facilitates progress and advancement.138 Disclosure, although a key 
aspect, is not the main reason for granting patent protections.139 Patents pro-
                                                                                                                           
 130 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:4 (discussing the constitutional clause and 
related patent laws derived from the power). 
 131 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (stating that every patent shall provide the holder with time 
limited exclusion rights to prevent others from utilizing what it contains without permission); id. § 261 
(stating that patents come with the same rights as personal property); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, 
§ 1:4 (discussing the rights granted with a patent). 
 132 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:4. 
 133 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (setting forth the right to exclude others from utilizing the holder’s intel-
lectual property); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:4 (discussing the rights and protections con-
veyed with a patent). 
 134 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1998); see W. Elec. Co. 
v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 549, 1976 WL 21189, *4 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (discussing 
the various protection and benefits of patents); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:2, 1:4 (discussing 
patent rights and protections). 
 135 See Thomas & Betts Corp., 138 F.3d at 284 (discussing the requirement that a patent seeker 
make an adequate and full disclosure of the invention to receive the patent); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 512 F. Supp. 792, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussing the adequacy of infor-
mation disclosed in a patent filing); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:2 (discussing patent protec-
tions, policies, and the benefits to the public). 
 136 See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1945) (stating that 
the primary purpose of a patent is the advancement of science through disclosure); MILLS ET AL., 
supra note 128, § 1:2 (discussing patent protections and policies). 
 137 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, 
§ 1:2. 
 138 Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262; MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:2. 
 139 See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (stating that the purpose of the patent system is to foster innova-
tion and advancement); Sinclair & Carroll Co., 325 U.S. at 330–31 (stating that the purpose of the 
patent system is the advancement of science, technology, and society); W. Elec. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. 
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mote and encourage innovation by assuring inventors and creators that their 
work will be protected and allow for them to benefit from their efforts.140 With 
their work guarded, patent holders can freely introduce their invention into the 
public and utilize it how they see fit.141 The public benefits from the new tech-
nology and innovation in exchange for a time-limited monopoly.142 
Patents are issued through the Unites States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”).143 This agency oversees the applications and reviews submitted 
materials in order to determine if a patent should be issued, granting the appli-
cant the protections it carries.144 A new idea alone is insufficient to receive a 
patent.145 An applicant must also meet specific criteria, technical aspects, and 
have legal merit.146 Further, the patent application cannot conflict with an al-
ready patented idea, thus requiring something new and non-public in order to 
proceed.147 As a result, applicants should conduct a search to ensure that their 
invention is not already patented.148 Conflicts with active patents can lead to 
infringement suits for violations of the property and exclusion rights that pro-
tect inventions.149 
Utility, design, and plant patents are the three major types of patents is-
sued by the USPTO.150 Utility patents, or patents for invention, are issued for 
the invention of a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or a new and useful improvement thereof.151 Patent holders are 
allowed to exclude others from producing, using, or selling the invention for 
up to twenty years from the day the application is filed.152 These protections 
and rights are subject to the payment of maintenance fees.153 In recent years, 
                                                                                                                           
(BNA) at 549 (stating how the policy of patent law allows inventors to exclude others from using their 
inventions which provides them with a lawful monopoly on their work); MILLS ET AL., supra note 
128, § 1:2 (discussing patent protections and policies). 
 140 W. Elec. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 549; MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:2. 
 141 W. Elec. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 549; MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:2. 
 142 Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262; Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985); MILLS ET 
AL., supra note 128, § 1:2. 
 143 Patent FAQs, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/help/
patent-help#1193 [https://perma.cc/94ZB-28BD]. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Types of Patents, supra note 28. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. Maintenance fees are upkeep payments to the USPTO that are required for a utility patent 
to remain in force and continue to convey rights and protections. Maintain Your Patent, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-
your-patent [https://perma.cc/F3RT-QXN6]. Payments are due 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after the 
issuance of the patent and the amount owed increases from payment period to payment period. 
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approximately ninety percent of the patents issued by the USPTO have been 
utility patents.154 The USPTO also issues design and plant patents, however, 
this Note centers on a hypothetical utility patent. 155 
Patents are treated as the personal property of the holder.156 As such, a pa-
tent can be utilized, sold, divided, transferred, licensed, assigned, and any other 
action that is generally associated with the free use of personal property.157 
Additionally, the interest in a patent application is treated the same as an issued 
patent.158 Therefore, an application, once filed with the USPTO can be sold or 
transferred before it is final.159 
B. Patent Infringement 
When the personal property or patent rights of the holder are violated, the 
violator has infringed upon the patent.160 Various actions can qualify as in-
fringement, but every type shares the common element of utilizing intellectual 
property that belongs solely to the holder.161 A patent holder can bring an in-
fringement suit, which is a civil cause of action, in order to enforce their 
                                                                                                                           
USPTO Fee Schedule: Patent Maintenance Fees, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule 
[https://perma.cc/K4UH-RLEB]. Current fees are $400, $900, and $1850 respectively per peri-
od. Id. These maintenance fees work to ensure that patent holders are currently utilizing their 
intellectual property. Patent Maintenance Fees, Bus. Pats. (2017), http://www.the-business-of-
patents.com/patent-maintenance-fees.html [https://perma.cc/DE7G-ADF4]. Thus, if a payment 
is purposely missed, the protections can be extinguished and the intellectual property can be 
released into the public domain. Id. 
 154 Types of Patents, supra note 28. 
 155 See infra notes 272–276 and accompanying text (setting forth hypothetical patent created for 
the purposes of this Note). The USPTO issues design patents for a new, original, and ornamental de-
sign exemplified in or applied to a holder’s product. Types of Patents, supra note 28. Holders of this 
type are allowed to exclude others from producing, using, or selling the design set forth in the patent. 
Id. Design patents granted from applications filed on or after May 13, 2015, provide protections for 
fifteen years. Id. Design patents granted from applications filed before May 13, 2015, provide protec-
tions for fourteen years. Id. Unlike utility patents, design patents do not require the payment of 
maintenance fees for protections to continue. Id. Plant patents are issued for a newly invented or dis-
covered asexually reproduced plant that is distinct. Id. Such plants include cultivated sports, mutants, 
hybrids, and newly found seedlings. Id. A tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an unrefined state 
are excluded and not patentable. Id. Plant patent holders can exclude others from producing, using, or 
selling the plant for up to twenty years from the date the application is filed. Id. Protections continue 
for the specified time and are not subject to the payment of maintenance fees of any kind. Id. 
 156 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
 157 Id. (stating that patents are personal property and may be freely used as such which allows the 
holder to assign, grant, convey and interest in, and perform any other act exercisable with personal 
property). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. § 271. 
 161 Id. 
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rights.162 In a successful action, a patent holder can receive monetary damages, 
such as a reasonable royalty, injunctive relief, and other equitable remedies.163 
A court can also award treble damages for infringement if deemed appropri-
ate.164 Such an increase in damages is normally ordered in cases of willful and 
intentional infringement.165 
The most effective way to stop infringement is through a permanent in-
junction, which is a court order commanding an action.166 The common belief 
is that the courts will generally issue an injunction in an infringement case.167 
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that injunctions for infringement are not 
automatic, and a court is free to apply the principles of equity and rule accord-
ingly.168 The Supreme Court held that to grant an injunction, the patent holder 
must satisfy a four-part test and show that it is the sole available remedy.169 To 
do so, the plaintiff must establish (1) that irreparable harm has been suffered, 
(2) that remedies at law are insufficient, (3) that within a balance of hardships, 
an equitable remedy is justified in favor of the plaintiff, and (4) that the interest 
of the public will not be harmed from the grant of an injunction.170 Through 
these factors, a holder can show that an immediate halt is warranted, but such a 
grant of relief does not automatically flow from the protections provided to a 
patent.171 If an injunction is not granted, the plaintiff can still receive damages 
through remedies at law for past, present, and continued infringement.172 
Although the Supreme Court held that this test applies in infringement 
cases brought under the Patent Act, it provided little guidance for future deci-
sions.173 The Court expressly stated that it takes no position in which types of 
infringement cases merit injunctive relief.174 Rather, the decision is to the dis-
                                                                                                                           
 162 Id. § 281. 
 163 Id. §§ 271, 283, 284. 
 164 Id. § 284. 
 165 i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 166 See Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (upholding 
the grant of an injunction that prevented further infringement of a patented invention); Injunction, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 167 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (2005). 
 168 35 U.S.C. § 283 (stating that a court may grant an injunction for infringement in accordance 
with the principles of equity); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (stating 
that injunctive relief sought under the Patent Act is subject to the equitable discretion of the district 
court). 
 169 eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See id. at 391, 394 (setting out the test to be applied, but not providing any bright line stand-
ards for the application of the test). 
 174 Id. at 394 (“[W]e take no position on whether permanent injunctive relief should or should not 
issue in this particular case, or indeed in any number of other disputes arising under the Patent Act. 
We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable 
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cretion of the district court judges, subject to traditional principles of equity.175 
Further, discretion must be limited to the extent that similar cases result in the 
same outcome to promote uniformity and justice.176 The Supreme Court did, 
however, state that categorical approaches to certain circumstances within a 
case should be avoided and that the specific facts of every case need to be re-
viewed prior to issuing a decision.177 
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s four-part test ruling, district courts 
have resolved numerous and various cases.178 For example, in Mercexchange, 
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., a patent holder sought a permanent injunction against an 
online business that willfully infringed on its patent that the business utilizes in 
order to operate and function.179 The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia denied the injunction because the patent holder failed to meet the re-
quirements of the four-part test.180 The plaintiff’s consistent practice and will-
ingness to license its patent, lack of commercially utilizing the patent, and its 
use of patent protections to collect, negotiate for, and recover money rather 
than to protect its intellectual property prevented a showing of irreparable 
harm.181 Therefore, the court believed that remedies at law were adequate to 
compensate the patent holder for the infringement because it did not utilize the 
patent and consistently granted use permissions.182 The hardships of the parties 
were balanced because the patent holder licenses its patents which will be un-
                                                                                                                           
discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional 
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.”). 
 175 See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 394 (setting out the test, but remanding the case to the district court 
for application); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discuss-
ing the considerable discretion district courts have in their evaluation of whether to grant injunctive 
relief). 
 176 eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 394; Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005); 
Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 856. 
 177 eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 393. For example, a holder not utilizing a patent in their possession 
does not preclude that holder from obtaining an injunction. Id. (stating that the injunctive relief test 
should not be applied categorically and that lack of commercial activity utilizing the patent would not 
preclude the grant of injunctive relief). Further, a patent holder’s willingness to license or grant per-
missions to another also does not bar a holder from equitable relief. Id. Although either of these fac-
tors can lead to a denial of a permanent injunction, they should not be viewed as an automatic bar 
from exercising patent exclusion rights. Id. at 393–94. The Court reinforced this approach because it is 
a normal occurrence for patent holders, who are unable to bring their work to market, to grant permis-
sions to practice their work to others in order to obtain a profit, benefit, or satisfaction. Id. at 393. 
 178 Robert Bosch L.L.C. v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Acumed 
L.L.C. v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 
500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 560 (E.D. Va. 2007); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 441–42 
(D. Del. 2007). 
 179 500 F. Supp. 2d at 560. 
 180 Id. at 590–91. 
 181 Id. at 569–72. The plaintiff’s failure to show that an injunction is needed to protect its brand 
name, market share, reputation, and good will also prevented a showing of the first part of the test. Id. 
at 570. 
 182 Id. at 582. 
2018] Forcing Patent Licensing with Best Available Technology Laws 1069 
affected regardless of an injunction and the infringer is now believed to have 
designed around the patent and eliminated its dependence on the intellectual 
property.183 Finally, it is evident that the public benefits from the patent system 
and the exchange of benefits that result from the granting of protections.184 The 
court, however, believed that the public is best served without enjoining the 
infringer because the defendant is a multibillion dollar company with a sub-
stantial impact on the United States economy and the patent holder is a two 
person company that solely licenses its intellectual property.185 
In Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., a patent holder filed a motion to enjoin an 
infringer from utilizing its intellectual property to create a mechanical-based 
safety control device for the discharging of pressurized fluids from pressurized 
tanks.186 The plaintiff and defendant are the only two producers of this tech-
nology and are in direct competition in their market.187 The District Court for 
the District of Delaware denied the patent holder’s request for an injunction 
because it failed to satisfy the equitable remedy test.188 Plaintiff attempted to 
show that it will face irreparable harm because it could lose additional market 
share, profits, and goodwill, but it failed to provide detailed figures, market 
data, or revenues that amount to more than speculation.189 Additionally, plain-
tiff argued that its right to exclude allows for it to be a monopoly supplier of 
the product, but the court dismissed this as a common factor and useless in 
meeting any part of the test.190 Thus, the patent holder could not show that 
monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for infringement.191 Further, 
the court acknowledged that protecting patent rights is important to the pub-
lic’s interests.192 Enjoining the defendant, however, posed a far greater harm 
because it would force the defendant to cease production of the device, which 
would then force its customers, billion dollar fabrication plants, to cease opera-
tions and embark on a costly search for an alternative.193 
Conversely, in Robert Bosch L.L.C. v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ordered a permanent injunction 
against an infringer who utilized a patent to produce a product it sold in direct 
                                                                                                                           
 183 Id. at 583–84. 
 184 Id. at 586–87. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Praxair, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 441–42. The plaintiff’s patents disclose a device that pro-
vides increased safety and help in the handling, storage, and transporting of highly pressurized materi-
als in day to day operations or in the event of mistakes and failures. Id. 
 187 Id. at 442. 
 188 Id. at 443. 
 189 Id. at 443–44. 
 190 Id. at 444. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 443. 
 193 Id. 
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competition with the patent holder.194 Infringement caused the patent holder to 
suffer irreparable harm because it directly competed with the infringer which 
resulted in an unrebutted documented loss of market share, profits, access to 
potential customers and an erosion of its product’s price.195 Thus, the court 
found that monetary damages were inadequate because they cannot remedy the 
harm caused by the infringement.196 Further, the Circuit Court ruled that a bal-
ance of hardships comes out in favor of the patent holder because failing to 
enjoin the infringer would further the irreparable harm and force competition 
against its own product in a highly competitive market.197 
Similarly, in Acumed L.L.C. v. Stryker Corp., the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the enjoining of an infringer that utilized the patent of 
another to develop and manufacture a similar medical device that treats bone 
fractures.198 The court found that the patent holder suffered irreparable harm 
because the infringer is a direct competitor and its product led to a loss in prof-
its, sales, and market share.199 Therefore, the irreparable harm could not be 
remedied adequately by a monetary award.200 The infringer referred to licenses 
granted by the patent holder to other competitors in an attempt to show the 
holder had a willingness to license its intellectual property and therefore reme-
dies at law were sufficient.201 The Circuit Court, however, found that the two 
licenses granted did not display willingness because one had been granted on 
account of a settlement agreement from an infringement suit and the other 
granted permission to a non-direct competitor.202 A balance of hardships also 
came out in favor of the patent holder because the infringer was a much larger 
company, the infringing product only accounted for a small portion of its sales, 
and it had a non-infringing alternative that it had previously chose not to utilize 
for business reasons.203 Finally, the court reasoned that granting a permanent 
injunction against the infringer would not harm the public because alternatives 
                                                                                                                           
 194 Robert Bosch L.L.C., 659 F.3d at 1145. 
 195 Id. at 1151, 1153. 
 196 Id. at 1155. The patent holder also introduced evidence that the infringer faced financial prob-
lems and is currently under severe financial stress which made its ability to pay a monetary judgment 
questionable. Id. at 1154. 
 197 Id. at 1156. The court also held that the public interest part of the test is neutral and unim-
portant in this decision. Id. 
 198 551 F.3d at 1326. 
 199 Id. at 1327–28. 
 200 Id. at 1329. 
 201 Id. at 1328–29. 
 202 Id. at 1328. The Court also noted that past licenses do not automatically show a willingness to 
grant to others because adding a new competitor may create irreparable harm that did not exist with 
current licensees. Id. at 1329. 
 203 Id. at 1329–30. 
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to both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s product existed on the market and no 
public health concerns existed.204 
C. Monopoly and Antitrust Law 
Essentially, a patent is a government issued monopoly that protects the 
holder’s idea or invention by allowing them to exclude others from utilizing 
what is set forth in the patent.205 Traditionally, a monopoly exists when one 
economic entity has control or a significant advantage over a market within a 
specific area, region, or nation.206 As a result of the entity’s efforts, it moves 
into a position that allows for control of prices and other market factors that 
lead to an ability to suppress and remove competition.207 This power can also 
harm the public, as it will be subject to the entity’s prices if no viable competi-
tion exists.208 
Although control is an important factor in defining a monopoly, the term 
can also apply to circumstances where the entity substantially approaches the 
economic position.209 For example, controlling ninety percent of a market has 
been held to be enough to be considered a monopoly.210 Other percentages of 
lesser amounts can qualify as well, but no exact set percentages are available 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Id. at 1331. 
 205 Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Sawyer-Man Elec. Co., 53 F. 592, 598 (2d Cir. 1892); MILLS ET 
AL., supra note 128, § 1:6. 
 206 Monopoly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of 
Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1810–12 (1990) (discussing 
what constitutes a monopoly and the characteristics of one within an industry). 
 207 JOHN BOURDEAU ET AL., 54A AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: MONOPOLIES AND RE-
STRAINTS OF TRADE § 770 (2d ed. 2016). A monopoly is created through the elimination of competi-
tion and develops from the concentration of a business or market into the control of an entity. Id. See 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
atr/legacy/2009/05/11/236681.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YY9-KVBY] (discussing the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act, monopolies, and anti-competitive conduct). 
 208 BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 207, § 770. Price control, if abused, allows the controlling 
entity to set prices as they see fit, which will likely coincide with maximizing profits. See id. (stating 
that price control is harmful to the public); Monopoly and Competition, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 
(Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.britannica.com/topic/monopoly-economics [https://perma.cc/5TK9-
RRU8] (discussing monopolies and their ability to set prices and maximize profits). Essentially, if the 
product is vital, a controlling entity can overcharge and exploit the public. See Peoples Savs. Bank v. 
Stoddard, 102 N.W.2d 777, 793 (1960) (“Monopoly may be said to be the result of the practical elim-
ination of effective business competition which thereby creates a power to control prices to the harm 
of the public.”); BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 207, § 770 (discussing price control and public 
harm). 
 209 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that control 
over ninety percent of a market is enough to constitute a monopoly, but around sixty percent is ques-
tionable, and thirty-three percent is not enough); Monopoly, supra note 206. 
 210 Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424. 
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to compare and review all situations.211 Thus, a court will review all available 
circumstances to determine if a monopoly exists.212 
Since the formation of the United States, the public has feared the eco-
nomic power that a monopoly provides to an entity.213 By 1890, a limited 
number of corporations and individuals amassed an immense amount of wealth 
by forming monopolies and bringing the control of a market into their 
hands.214 As a result, competition was eliminated, prices were controlled, and 
the public was subject to their position that fueled the fear and concern.215 
To combat this economic issue, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust 
Act in July 1890.216 This new law sought to prevent abuse by monopolies and 
suppress economic actions that lead to their formation.217 Such economic ac-
tions include restrictions on trade and production, restraining competition and 
commercial transactions, and other acts that lead to control of a market.218 Es-
sentially, the monopolistic entity uses its position to influence the market and 
drive out competition.219 All of these actions are regarded as harmful to public 
welfare and the consumer economy.220 Congress believed that public welfare is 
best served when resources are used in the most efficient and effective ways, 
through competition fueled by quality and price, and when the market is driven 
to create and offer the best products and services.221 Therefore, through the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress sought to promote and protect competition 
while making certain actions that stifle it illegal.222 The Sherman Antitrust Act 
is not designed to protect businesses from capitalism and market forces.223 If 
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 212 Id. 
 213 JOHN BOURDEAU ET AL., 54 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: MONOPOLIES AND RE-
STRAINTS OF TRADE § 1 (2d ed. 2016). 
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 215 Id. 
 216 Id.; Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209–210 (1890) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)). 
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 221 Id. 
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an entity, through efficient and effective competitive business practices moves 
into a position where market share is controlled and obtains monopoly status, the 
Sherman Antitrust Act will not be invoked and the monopoly will be lawful.224 
If a patent holder enters a market and is successful, leading to monopoly 
status, the holder will not automatically face antitrust lawsuits.225 The right to a 
monopoly is one of the major benefits of the patent system and is essentially 
its entire purpose.226 The protections offered by the law to safeguard a holder’s 
monopoly ensures that no one can utilize the patent without permission and 
protects the economic value of the invention.227 
Patent protections can be suspended or unenforceable if the patent holder 
engages in misuse.228 Misuse is a common law defense to an infringement ac-
tion and is based on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.229 An example of 
misuse is “tying” which is the act of making the sale or license of a patent con-
tingent on another transaction, sale, or other financial obligation.230 The Su-
preme Court first recognized patent misuse in Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Sup-
piger Co., a 1942 case where the plaintiff licensed a machine, but also required 
that licensees purchase another product unrelated to the patent.231 The Court 
found this conduct anticompetitive and an attempt by the holder to abuse it 
position through its patent.232 Therefore, the Court blocked the infringement 
action because of the plaintiff’s patent misuse.233 
The doctrine of patent misuse has been developed since its recognition by 
the Supreme Court.234 The doctrine, however, relies greatly on antitrust law 
and shares numerous similarities, specifically, the anticompetitive conduct it 
scrutinizes.235 In 1988, Congress passed the Patent Misuse Reform Act, which 
codified the defense and grew the similarities between the two doctrines.236 
                                                                                                                           
(4th Cir. 2002); E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 302 (10th Cir. 1975); 
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 228 B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 229 Brett M. Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Mis-
use: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 867 (2000). 
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570 (2010). 
 231 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490, 494 (1942). 
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 233 Id. at 490–491. 
 234 Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 229, at 868. 
 235 Olson, supra note 230, at 571. 
 236 Patent Misuse Reform Act, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) 
(2012)); Olson, supra note 230, at 572. 
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For example, a defense based on tying now requires a showing that the patent 
holder has market power and position which allows them to manipulate the 
market.237 Previously, the defense did not require this element and a defendant 
could rely on the anticompetitive conduct of the patent holder.238 Overall, the 
doctrine is essentially the Sherman Antitrust Act of patent law, even though 
both bodies of law can apply simultaneously to a situation where a patent 
holder engages in anticompetitive conduct.239 
D. Best Available Technology Laws 
The Government cannot pass a law that directly forces holders to utilize 
their patent.240 It can, however, pass a “Best Available Technology” law that 
forces the use of the best available option for a particular purpose.241 Best 
available technology laws set a standard that essentially requires the use of the 
most efficient and environmentally beneficial technology within a regulated 
field so long as it is economically feasible.242 Generally, it does not require that 
the party affected by the regulation develop its own technology to meet the 
standard.243 It does, however, require that the most efficient and affordable 
technology that is available is used in order to meet the standard of the law.244 
No exact figures or numerical standards are set and the regulation solely calls 
for the use of the available technology.245 Through this, the law essentially 
calls for the highest standard possible for the regulated field without setting a 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Olson, supra note 230, at 572. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 570–72. 
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 243 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (requiring the use of the best available technology); Learn 
About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing what is required from standards set through 
mandates). 
 244 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (utilizing a best available technology law standard); Learn 
About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing best available technology law standards). 
 245 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (utilizing a best available technology law standard without 
setting an exact level); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing mandates that 
require the utilization of optimal technology without requiring specific levels). 
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mark that needs to be achieved.246 The law, and what it requires, aims to attain 
the best result for the item that is being regulated.247 
Through best available technology laws, optimal but unutilized technolo-
gy can be forced into use because of the need to comply with the law.248 Any 
entity under the regulation that chooses not to do so will violate the law and 
face consequences.249 Thus, to be compliant, the entity will need to utilize the 
best technology available that is economically feasible to implement.250 There-
fore, if a patent holder has control of a patent that is the best available technol-
ogy that is economically achievable, it could be pulled into the standard and 
will be the technology that must be used to comply with the law.251 
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) utilizes a best available technology stand-
ard to achieve Congress’s goal of eliminating the discharging of pollutants 
from point sources and its national goal to protect, preserve, and restore the 
waters of the United States.252 The standard sets effluent limitations for certain 
entities regulated under the statute.253 The Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) generally determines the best available technology that is economical-
ly achievable through the guidelines established by Congress.254 Accordingly, 
the standard requires the use of the best practices and control methods current-
ly achievable which include pollution treatment techniques, innovations, opti-
mal modes of operation, and any other alternative techniques, methods, pro-
cesses, or procedures.255 These elements are further examined through other 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (utilizing a best available technology standard to set a required 
level without stating an exact requirement, leading to the level to progress with time); Learn About 
Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing standards that develop from mandates). 
 247 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (utilizing a best available technology standard to mandate the 
use of optimal technology and processes); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing 
mandates that require a certain level or standard be met). 
 248 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (requiring a standard to be met in order for a regulated entity to 
be compliant); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing standards from mandates). 
 249 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (requiring a standard to be met for compliance); Learn About 
Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing standards from mandates). 
 250 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (utilizing a best available technology standard to set the level 
required for compliance); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing standards for-
mulated from mandates). 
 251 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (utilizing a best available technology standard); Learn About 
Effluent Guidelines, supra note 30 (discussing what formulates compliance with a standard). 
 252 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (stating that compliance “shall require application of the best available 
technology economically achievable for such category or class, which will result in reasonable further 
progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants”); Id. § 1251(a) (setting 
forth the national goal and including seven objectives to achieve it). 
 253 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (requiring the use of best available technology that is economically 
achievable). 
 254 Id. (stating that the EPA shall make this determination); Id. § 1314(b)(2) (granting the EPA 
the ability to determine what satisfies mandated standards and the ability to “specify factors to be 
taken into account in determining the best measures and practices available to comply with subsection 
(b)(2) of section 1311”). 
 255 Id. § 1314(b)(2). 
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factors such as cost, development over time, environmental impact on non-
water aspects, engineering requirements, and the specific industry that will be 
affected.256 Further, the EPA will review an entire industry and research meth-
ods and practices currently utilized to determine what standard is possible.257 
Thus, an optimal operation within an industry will be used in determining what 
the standard should require.258 The agency also looks to pilot plant studies, 
bench scale studies, and even foreign operations.259 
Setting such a standard is an efficient option that avoids the need for con-
stantly updated legislation that would otherwise be needed to mandate the use of 
optimal technology.260 Accordingly, the standard can progress with the develop-
ment of new technology that ensures the highest economically achievable effi-
ciency is attained by those governed by the statutes and regulations.261 Further, a 
best available technology law sets a performance requirement and not a design 
requirement.262 This requires the entity regulated by the standard to achieve that 
level of performance, but allows for the entity to freely choose how to attain 
it.263 Although there is a level of choice, it is likely that the use of the most mod-
ern technology with the greatest efficiency will be used to comply.264 Entities 
regulated by the standard must meet their performance level, which creates an 
environmental benefit that would otherwise be lost or delayed.265 An entity can 
receive a variance that excludes them from the standard, but these are rarely 
granted which ensures that the standard is upheld wherever possible.266 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Id. (“Factors relating to the assessment of best available technology shall take into account the 
age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the applica-
tion of various types of control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduc-
tion, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors 
as the Administrator deems appropriate.”). 
 257 Kennecott v. U.S.E.P.A., 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985); ENVTL. LAW INST., 2 LAW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 3:59 (2017) (covering the best available technology standard and 
the factors that influence the level of performance required by regulated entities). 
 258 Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 448; ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 257, § 13:59 (discussing factors 
for the standard as well as anomalies within industries). 
 259 Karen M. Wardzinski et al., Water Pollution Control Under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 8, 20 (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1990) 
(discussing sources of information used by the EPA to set the standard for compliance with the Clean 
Water Act and other mandates). 
 260 See DIETRICH H. EARNHART & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, POLLUTION LIMITS AND POLLUTERS’ 
EFFORTS TO COMPLY 36 (2011) (discussing mandates that require a certain standard to be reached 
rather than a specific level or utilization of a certain technology or process). 
 261 See id. (discussing mandates that require the utilization of technology that is optimal without 
stating directly what must be utilized at that present time). 
 262 Id. at 36–37. 
 263 Id. 
 264 See id. (discussing the mandated standards that are likely updated with the advancement of 
technology and processes). 
 265 See Wardzinski et al., supra note 259, at 24 (indicating that entities regulated by best available 
technology standards are only excepted from the requirements under limited circumstances). 
 266 Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF A BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY LAW 
ON A PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTALLY OPTIMAL PATENT 
This Part contains the central argument of this Note and relies on a hypo-
thetical patent to an environmentally optimal shellfishing dredge, detailed in 
Section A, that is owned by a shellfishing entity in the industry.267 With the 
intellectual property in place, an overview covering the likely status of the pa-
tent in the current shellfishing industry is discussed in Section B and concludes 
that the environmentally optimal device will go unused and its benefits unreal-
ized.268 To combat this issue, Section C suggests that the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts should formulate a best available technology law that will man-
date the utilization of the optimal device through its required standard of per-
formance.269 This solution, however, is problematic due to the protections the 
patent provides its holder, no legal obligations to license the device, and the 
creation of a monopoly status for the holder due to the mandate.270 Therefore, 
Section D argues that any shellfisherman that are unable to lawfully use the 
device, should willfully infringe which will result in an infringement suit that 
will end with an order for reasonable royalties to be paid, the equivalent of a 
lawfully granted license.271 
A. Hypothetical Environmentally Optimal Patent 
Assume, for the purposes of this Note, that a commercial fisherman in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts purchased a patent that contains the rights to 
an environmentally optimal dredge that would substantially mitigate the harm 
caused by current dredges.272 The fisherman purchased the patent because the 
new device, although slightly more expensive, was believed to increase shell-
fish yield and allow for cheaper operational costs, thus providing an edge in 
the market.273 When tested, the yield remained the same, but the environmental 
                                                                                                                           
 267 See infra notes 272–276 and accompanying text. 
 268 See infra notes 277–298 and accompanying text. 
 269 See infra notes 299–325 and accompanying text. 
 270 See infra notes 299–325 and accompanying text. 
 271 See infra notes 326–352 and accompanying text. 
 272 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (stating that patents are treated as personal property); NAT’L OCE-
ANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (detailing the harmful environmental impact of 
dredging); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19–20 (detailing the high shellfish mortality rates). 
 273 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (stating that patents are treated as personal property); NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (detailing the harmful environmental impact of dredg-
ing); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18–20 (discussing high dredge efficiency and shellfish mortality 
rates from dredging); Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 (providing insight in to the U.S. sea-
food market). 
1078 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1049 
harm decreased substantially.274 Due to the lack of increased yield and the cost 
to implement this new device, the commercial fisherman decided not to utilize 
the environmentally optimal dredge for business reasons.275 As a result, the 
environmental benefit this new device can create is stored away, unused, and 
protected by patent law.276 
B. Current Status of the Environmentally Optimal Patent  
and the Shellfishing Industry 
The availability of an environmentally optimal patent should trigger an 
effort to promote its use.277 Generally, there are no laws that force a patent 
holder to utilize their invention or idea.278 Patent laws protect the inventor, al-
lowing the holder to use their rights in any way they choose.279 The right to 
exclude is also an inherent right to a patent holder, further allowing them to 
prevent others from using their invention.280 Normally, when an optimal inven-
tion is created, it is both economical and beneficial to introduce it into the 
market and into the public.281 The patent holder benefits from its use economi-
cally and earns satisfaction from their work while the affected market becomes 
better and more efficient.282 Essentially, all parties involved benefit from tech-
                                                                                                                           
 274 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (discussing the nega-
tive physical, chemical, and biological impact of dredging); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18–20 
(detailing dredge performance). 
 275 See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (detailing the negative 
impact of dredging on the environment); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18–20 (detailing the perfor-
mance of current dredges); Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 (discussing U.S. seafood con-
sumption). 
 276 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (setting forth a patent holders rights which does not include any 
duty to utilize the protected intellectual property); id. § 261 (stating that patents are treated as personal 
property); NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30 (detailing the environ-
mental harm caused by dredging); Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 18–20 (detailing the issues with 
current dredges). 
 277 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (2012) (requiring the use of the best available technology that is 
economically achievable in the establishment of performance standards); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (set-
ting forth patent rights); supra notes 240–266 and accompanying text (discussing best available tech-
nology standards). 
 278 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (setting forth the rights of a patent holder, which does not include 
any mandate to utilize the intellectual property). 
 279 Id.; supra notes 125–204 and accompanying text (discussing patent law and policy). 
 280 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); supra notes 125–204 and accompanying text (discussing patent law and 
policy). 
 281 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (discussing the benefits of 
patent law and its impact in providing a public benefit); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 
325 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1945) (stating that the purpose of the U.S. patent system is to foster innovation 
and the advancement of technology); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533–34 (1870) 
(stating that the purpose of patents are to produce a public benefit from new inventions while securing 
a benefit for the inventor by offering protections). 
 282 See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (discussing the balanced benefits of the patent system); Sinclair 
& Carroll Co., 325 U.S. at 330–31 (discussing the public benefit gained from the patent system); 
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nological advancements and this continued cycle has driven every industry and 
market in the world.283 
In this situation, the holder of an environmentally optimal patent has no 
obligation to utilize the invention.284 Due to the rights that accompany a patent, 
the holder is free to choose what actions to take.285 The patent holder can sell, 
transfer, license, produce, or perform any other action associated with personal 
property.286 They also have the right to simply hold the patent and do noth-
ing.287 Thus, if the holder does not utilize the patent in any way its benefits will 
be unrealized.288 Further, if anyone acts without the consent of the holder and 
utilizes the patented invention they will be infringing.289 Generally, infringe-
ment will lead to a lawsuit to enforce patent rights and can result in an award 
of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.290 Without 
permission, a license, or ownership of the patent, the best option for someone 
that hopes to use the invention is to essentially wait until the protections ex-
                                                                                                                           
Seymour, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 533–34 (discussing the benefits patents provide the public and hold-
ers). 
 283 See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (stating that the patent system fosters innovation and advance-
ment); Sinclair & Carroll Co., 325 U.S. at 330–31 (discussing the benefits patents provide society); 
Seymour, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 533–34 (stating that the patent system facilitates progress). 
 284 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (stating the rights of a patent holder, which contains no mandate to 
utilize the invention); W. Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 549 (S.D. Fla. 
1976) (stating that a patent holder has sole control over the invention); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, 
§§ 1:2, 1:4 (discussing the rights of a patent holder which does not include any mandate to 
practice a patent). 
 285 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 261 (setting forth the rights of a patent holder); W. Elec. Co., 190 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 549 (stating that a patent holder has exclusive rights to the invention); MILLS ET 
AL., supra note 128, §§ 1:2, 1:4 (discussing the rights of a patent holder). 
 286 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 261 (stating that the rights of patent holder to the protected intel-
lectual property is the same as personal property rights); W. Elec. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 549 
(stating that a patent grants a holder all benefits to the invention); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, 
§§ 1:2, 1:4 (discussing all of the property rights of a patent holder). 
 287 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 261 (allowing a patent holder to simply hold intellectual property 
and never utilize it); W. Elec. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 549 (stating that patented intellectual prop-
erty is solely owned by the holder who may choose not to use it in any way); MILLS ET AL., supra 
note 128, §§ 1:2, 1:4 (discussing patent rights which allow non-use of intellectual property). 
 288 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (stating that patents shall share the same rights as personal property, 
which allows them to simply hold the patent and never utilize it); W. Elec. Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
at 549 (stating that patent holders have exclusive ownership over their intellectual property and can 
exclude anyone from utilizing it); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, §§ 1:2, 1:4 (discussing patent 
rights and stating that a holder can utilize the intellectual property how they see fit and exclude 
others). 
 289 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (setting out a patent holder’s ability to exclude others); id. § 271 
(setting out what qualifies as patent infringement). 
 290 See id. § 271 (setting out what actions qualify as patent infringement); id § 281 (providing 
patent holders with the ability to bring a civil action for infringement to enforce their patent rights); id 
§ 283 (stating that infringement actions can result in injunctive relief); id § 284 (detailing the available 
monetary damages available for an infringement claim). 
1080 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1049 
pire.291 As such, the individual will need to wait twenty years from the applica-
tion filing date of the patent.292 
The hypothetical patent holder is active in the commercial shellfishing in-
dustry.293 Regardless of what technology is used in its operations, the entity is 
not utilizing the environmentally optimal patent.294 The current technology, so 
long as regulations set forth by the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries 
(“DMF”) are followed, is lawful.295 The DMF sets out specific regulations that 
set permit requirements, catch limits, seasons, and dredge dimensions, but do 
not specify what technology must be used.296 Thus, current DMF and Massa-
chusetts law is ineffective in promoting the use of the optimal patent and plac-
es no pressure on the patent holder to utilize the invention.297 Additionally, no 
violations of these regulations can be used to force the use of the patent be-
cause they do not address efficiency standards or technology standards.298 
C. Enacting a Best Available Technology Law to Induce the Use  
of the Environmentally Optimal Patent 
To force the environmentally optimal patent into use, the Massachusetts 
Legislature or the DMF should act and pass a best available technology law 
pertaining to dredging in state waters.299 Due to the new invention’s efficiency, 
capability to decrease the mortality rate, decreased impact on the environment, 
and ability to match current harvesting rates, it will be the best available tech-
nology.300 When enacted, every commercial dredging operation will be forced 
                                                                                                                           
 291 See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (discussing patent protections and the balanced benefit of 
providing a patent holder with those protections for a period of time in exchange for the intellectual 
property eventually being released for public use upon the expiration of those rights); MILLS ET AL., 
supra note 128, § 1:2 (discussing a patent holder’s protective rights and the expiration of those 
rights after a patent specific period of time when the intellectual property moves into the public 
domain). 
 292 See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (discussing patent rights and expiration, whereupon the intellec-
tual property is released into the public domain); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:2 (discussing 
patent rights and their expiration); Types of Patents, supra note 28 (stating that a utility patent ex-
pires after twenty years from the application date). 
 293 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3–7. 
 294 Id. at 3–7, 11–30; Meyer et al., supra note 10, at 19–20. 
 295 Supra note 41–74 and accompanying text (covering current laws and regulations). 
 296 Supra note 41–74 and accompanying text (covering current laws and regulations). 
 297 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30; Meyer et al., supra note 
10, at 19–20; supra notes 41–74 and accompanying text (covering current laws and regulations which 
include no mandates of that kind). 
 298 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, §§ 9, 13, 17, 67, 68, 72, 75 (2018); supra notes 41–74 and ac-
companying text (covering current laws and regulations). 
 299 See 33 U.S.C § 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard to force the use of 
environmentally optimal technology). 
 300 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 11–30; Meyer et al., supra note 
10, at 19–20; see supra notes 272–276 and accompanying text (detailing a hypothetical patent for the 
purposes of this Note). 
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to adapt and utilize the optimal patent in order to continue dredging.301 The 
commercial actor in control of the patent will be forced to use the technology 
as well.302 
Enacting a best available technology law will circumvent patent protec-
tions that prevented the utilization of the new technology.303 Under the new 
law, the patent holder must utilize the technology or cease operations, the latter 
of which is unlikely.304 Such a law will not qualify as infringement and will not 
violate any patent protections.305 
Although an environmental benefit will come from the passage of a best 
available technology law, its enactment will essentially hand control of the 
Massachusetts commercial shellfishing industry to the patent holder.306 Due to 
patent protections, the holder has sole access to the technology.307 If other 
commercial fishermen attempt to lawfully continue their operations with the 
use of the new technology, they will be infringing on the patent.308 This in-
                                                                                                                           
 301 See 33 U.S.C § 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard); EARNHART ET AL., 
supra note 260, at 36–37 (discussing laws that mandate a standard); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, 
supra note 30 (discussing standards that mandate use of a specific technology); supra notes 240–266 
and accompanying text (discussing best available technology laws). 
 302 See 33 U.S.C § 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard); EARNHART ET AL., 
supra note 260, at 36–37 (discussing laws that mandate a standard); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, 
supra note 30 (discussing standards that mandate use of a specific technology); supra notes 240–266 
and accompanying text (discussing best available technology laws). 
 303 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (setting forth patent rights); id. § 261 (stating a patent holder’s own-
ership and assignment rights); 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (utilizing a best available technology law standard to 
force the use of optimal technology); EARNHART ET AL., supra note 260, at 36–37 (discussing laws 
that mandate a standard); supra notes 240–266 and accompanying text (discussing best available tech-
nology laws). A due process claim may be brought by the patent holder or those affected within the 
industry, however, the situation and hypothetical facts that this Note relies on mitigate this possibility. 
Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Mar. 
2, 2018), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process [https://perma.cc/M747-N9B2]. 
 304 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (utilizing a standard to mandate the use of certain technology in order to 
operate lawfully); EARNHART ET AL., supra note 260, at 36–37 (discussing mandates that force the use 
of optimal technology); supra notes 240–266 and accompanying text (discussing best available tech-
nology laws). 
 305 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (setting out patent rights); id. § 271 (defining what constitutes pa-
tent infringement). This is not infringement or a violation of patent rights because the law will not 
force the utilization of the technology, it will only induce it as the choice to simply just hold the intel-
lectual property still remains. See id. §§ 154(a)(1), 271 (detailing patent rights and infringement). 
 306 See id. § 154(a)(1) (detailing patent rights and the right to exclude others from utilizing the 
intellectual property); Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Sawyer-Man Elec. Co., 53 F. 592, 598 (2d Cir. 1892) 
(equating a patent to a monopoly to intellectual property); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:6 (stat-
ing that patents are monopolies). 
 307 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1); Edison Elec. Light Co., 53 F. at 598; MILLS ET AL., supra note 
128, § 1:6. 
 308 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (setting forth what qualifies as infringement). 
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fringement will also be intentional, which may lead to treble damages.309 With 
complete control of the mandated technology, the patent holder will enjoy the 
benefits of a monopoly and remove all competition.310 
This monopoly will be lawful which further adds to the repercussions of 
enacting a best available technology law.311 By simply utilizing the technology 
that it owns to achieve control of the commercial shellfishing industry, the patent 
holder will not commit any type of anticompetitive activity that would invoke 
antitrust law.312 No market manipulation, pricing control, or other antitrust viola-
tions are likely to occur in this situation because the new law has already elimi-
nated competition.313 Thus, the patent holder will be in a monopolistic position 
that, without antitrust violations, will be uninterrupted and lawful.314 
Further, it is unlikely that any patent misuse will occur that will lead to a 
suspension of patent protections and an inability to sue for infringement.315 
Misuse is similar to anticompetitive activity, which under current circumstanc-
es will not occur.316 No tying is necessary to build the holder’s market position, 
                                                                                                                           
 309 See id. § 284 (stating allowed damages for infringement); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 
598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that willful infringement can lead to and is required to 
award treble damages). 
 310 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (discussing 
what constitutes control of a market); Edison Elec. Light Co., 53 F. at 598 (finding that patent rights 
are equal to a lawful monopoly on intellectual property); Monopoly, supra note 206 (defining monop-
oly as having control over a market in an area); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:6 (stating patents 
are monopolies). 
 311 See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing unlaw-
ful monopolies and anticompetitive conduct which the court “generally defined as conduct to obtain or 
maintain monopoly power as a result of competition on some basis other than the merits”); Dickson v. 
Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 202, 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing anti-competitive conduct 
and anti-monopoly law); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 
1981) (discussing monopolies derived from patents and what categorizes them as lawful or unlawful); 
Edison Elec. Light Co., 53 F. at 598 (equating patent rights to a lawful monopoly to the protected 
intellectual property); BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 213, § 1, 2, 46 (discussing monopolies and 
what qualifies as unlawful anticompetitive behavior); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:6 (discuss-
ing the monopoly granted with a patent). 
 312 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (2012) (setting out what qualifies as illegal anticompetitive acts); 
BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 213, §§ 1, 2 (discussing what violates anti-monopoly law). 
 313 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (setting forth what qualifies as a violation of anti-monopoly law); 
BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 213, §§ 1, 2 (discussing anti-monopoly law and what constitutes a 
violation). 
 314 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (setting out what is a violation of anti-monopoly law); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(1) (setting out patent rights); BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 213, §§ 1, 2 (discussing mo-
nopolies and restraint of trade). 
 315 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490–91, 494 (1942) (holding that 
patent misuse can lead to a suspension of patent rights and make an infringement action unavailable); 
Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 229, at 867 (stating that patent misuse is a defense to an infringe-
ment action). 
 316 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (containing anti-monopoly law); Olson, supra note 230, at 570–71 (dis-
cussing patent misuse); BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 213, §§ 1, 2 (discussing monopolies and re-
straint of trade). 
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and other manipulation is unnecessary because control of the market is already 
held.317 Unless a similar or a newer and more efficient patent is introduced that 
competes with the holder’s patent, which leads to an attempt to manipulate the 
market to hold control of its monopoly, no misuse is likely to occur.318 
Similarly, it is unlikely that an administrative agency or legislative body 
will proceed to enact such a law if it will simultaneously disrupt an entire in-
dustry and create a monopoly for a private entity.319 Meeting the supply and 
demand of an entire market overnight, however, is not an easy or relatively 
feasible task to accomplish.320 Thus, it is likely that other commercial shell-
fishing operations can obtain a license or other form of permission to gain ac-
cess to the patented technology.321 As a result, commercial actors already ac-
tive in the industry can obtain the ability to utilize the technology and continue 
their operations in an environmentally optimal manner.322 As previously stated, 
there is no law or force that can order the patent holder to agree to license or 
provide access to others in the industry.323 Hypothetically, it is unlikely that the 
patent holder’s operation alone can fill or even substantially meet the current 
output of the industry because it is just one shellfishing operation among many 
in Massachusetts.324 Thus, it would be wiser, both economically and financial-
ly, to grant permission to other commercial operations and profit from agree-
ments, sales, or license fees.325 
                                                                                                                           
 317 See Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 491 (discussing the lawful monopoly that patent rights 
grant); Edison Elec. Light Co., 53 F. at 598 (equating patent rights to a lawful monopoly to the pro-
tected intellectual property); MILLS ET AL., supra note 128, § 1:6 (discussing patents and the mo-
nopoly they provide); Olson, supra note 230, at 570 (defining tying as “the practice of making a sale 
or license of a product contingent on the purchase of some other good” and classifying this as patent 
misuse). 
 318 See Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 491 (discussing that patent rights can be manipulated and 
abused to obtain a monopoly, but the monopoly status granted with a patent does not qualify as such 
alone); Olson, supra note 230, at 572 (discussing patent misuse and the potential for waiver of en-
forcement of patent rights as a result of misuse). 
 319 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (setting forth the Sherman Antitrust Act and laws against unlawful mo-
nopolies); BOURDEAU ET AL., supra note 213, § 1 (discussing the national fear monopolies insight 
due to the concentrated economic power that can lead to public harm and exploitation). 
 320 See Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 (finding that Americans in 2009 consumed 4.833 
billion pounds of seafood and detailing the dietary health benefits). 
 321 See 35 U.S.C. § 261; eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (discuss-
ing patent licensing that occurs regularly). 
 322 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (stating ownership and assignment rights for patent holders); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard to mandate the use of optimal tech-
nology). 
 323 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (setting out patent rights that are exclusive to the holder). 
 324 See Lampert, supra note 10, at 1630 (discussing the high value of the seafood industry in the 
United States); Seafood & Human Health, supra note 10 (finding that Americans in 2009 consumed 
4.833 billion pounds of fish and shellfish). 
 325 See infra notes 326–352 and accompanying text (arguing for unauthorized shellfisherman to 
infringe upon the patent to indirectly force licensing). 
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D. Infringing to Indirectly Force Licensing 
Commercial shell fisherman can also choose to infringe upon the patent 
and utilize the technology rather than ceasing operations.326 By doing so, they 
will be intentionally violating the rights of the patent holder which will likely 
result in an infringement suit.327 The holder will likely press for an injunction 
to protect its intellectual property interests and its monopoly position.328 A 
court, however, will not automatically grant an injunction unless the holder 
meets the requirements of the four-part test.329 A plaintiff must establish that 
irreparable harm has been suffered, that remedies at law are insufficient, that 
within a balance of hardships, an equitable remedy is justified in favor of the 
plaintiff, and that the interest of the public will not be harmed from the grant of 
an injunction.330 Reviewing the test, the patent holder likely could not fully 
meet the requirements and display that it is in a position that necessitates an 
injunction.331 
The patent holder would likely be unable to establish irreparable harm 
because an infringing commercial fisherman is not a direct competitor in the 
dredge market.332 The patent will be infringed upon solely to gain access to the 
device to continue its own shellfishing operation which removes it from that 
direct market.333 Further, the patent holder will not lose any of its newly found 
dredge market share because its control on the market will be unaffected by an 
infringer utilizing the patent for its own use.334 If the patent holder can argue 
                                                                                                                           
 326 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (setting forth what qualifies as infringement of a patent); id. § 283 (grant-
ing courts the power to enjoin infringement); id. § 284 (setting out damages for infringement). 
 327 See id. § 281 (allowing civil actions for infringement); id. § 271 (setting forth what qualifies as 
infringement of a patent); eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (discussing infringement and the four-part in-
junction test); Infringement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining infringement as 
an action that violates the exclusive intellectual property rights of a patent holder). 
 328 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (allowing civil actions for infringement); id. § 271 (setting forth what 
qualifies as infringement of a patent); Infringement, supra note 327 (defining infringement as an ac-
tion that violates the exclusive intellectual property rights of a patent holder). 
 329 See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (discussing infringement and the four-part injunction test). 
 330 See id. (setting forth the four parts of the injunction test that need to be satisfied). 
 331 See id. (setting forth the four-part injunction test); infra notes 332–352 and accompanying text 
(arguing that infringement to force licensing of a patent) 
 332 See Robert Bosch L.L.C. v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1151, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the patent holder faced irreparable harm from continued infringement because both par-
ties directly competed in the same market, utilizing the same business plan, which led to a loss of 
market share, customers, and sales for the holder); Acumed L.L.C. v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 
1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a competitor infringing on a patent leading to a loss of market 
share, profits, and sales satisfies the irreparable harm element). 
 333 See Robert Bosch L.L.C., 659 F.3d at 1151, 1153 (discussing infringement and the harm from 
it due to the patent holder directly competing with the infringer); Acumed L.L.C., 551 F.3d at 1327–28 
(discussing infringement and agreeing that a past grant of a license does not remove the possibility of 
future irreparable harm). 
 334 See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443–44 (D. Del. 2007) (requiring evi-
dence that un-enjoined infringement will lead to a loss in market share, profits, or sales). 
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that losing its control over the Massachusetts shellfish dredging industry quali-
fies as irreparable harm, the fact that it is unlikely to be able to meet the de-
mand of the market and match the output of the numerous operators in the in-
dustry will further show that no market share is lost.335 Additionally, prior to 
the passage of the new law, the holder did not commercially use the patent due 
to business reasons, which further adds to a showing that there is no irrepara-
ble harm.336 
Due to the inability of the patent holder to show irreparable harm, it is 
likely that a court will find that monetary damages are adequate to remedy the 
infringement.337 Further, the monetary damages that are awarded would likely 
be the equivalent of a reasonable royalty that the patent holder could receive if 
it had granted a license to infringing commercial fisherman.338 Additionally, 
there is no harm within this scenario that cannot be remedied monetarily be-
cause there is no loss of profits, goodwill, or business opportunities that are 
more than speculative or feasible.339 Further, the ability to operate a monopoly 
or opportunity to do so is not meaningful to a review under the equitable rem-
edy test.340 
A balance of hardships will likely come out in favor of the infringer be-
cause an injunction will force every commercial shellfishing operation out of 
business.341 The lack of irreparable harm and the ability to compensate mone-
tarily also weigh in favor of the infringer because it is evident that only the 
infringer stands to face significant harm.342 Additionally, allowing the infringer 
to utilize the patent in exchange for monetary damages will essentially leave 
                                                                                                                           
 335 See id. (requiring evidence of a loss of market share to have a possibility of receiving an in-
junction). 
 336 See Mercexchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569–72 (E.D. Va. 2007) (hold-
ing that a lack of commercial use and willingness to license can be used as a factor in determining the 
irreparable harm element, but cannot be used as a categorical denial for an equitable remedy). 
 337 See Praxair, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (denying an injunction for an infringement action 
and holding that monetary damages are adequate to compensate the patent holder due to an inability to 
show irreparable harm). 
 338 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (stating that monetary damages should relate to the value of a reasonable 
royalty owed on a license of the intellectual property); eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. (discussing mone-
tary damages as an appropriate award when the factors required for injunctive relief are unsatisfied). 
 339 See Praxair, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 443–44 (requiring evidence that un-enjoined infringe-
ment will lead to a loss in market share, profits, or sales). 
 340 See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (setting forth the four-part test to obtain injunctive relief); 
Praxair, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (dismissing evidence of potential monopoly status as irrelevant 
to determining whether an injunction is warranted). 
 341 See Mercexchange L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d at 583–84 (discussing a balance of hardships con-
cerning a potentially willful infringer utilizing a patent for its core business and finding that monetary 
damages are suitable as opposed to an injunction). 
 342 See Acumen L.L.C., 551 F.3d at 1329–30 (balancing the hardships in favor of the infringer 
who will be the only party to realistically face harm from an injunction, and ruling that monetary 
damages are adequate to remedy the situation). 
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the entire industry as it was prior to the enactment of the new law, which is 
favorable to both sides.343 
Upholding intellectual property protections and keeping the patent system 
intact truly benefits the public.344 The public’s interest, however, is best served 
with the denial of an injunction in this scenario.345 If the infringing commercial 
operations are enjoined from utilizing the mandated dredge they will be forced 
to cease operations which will effectively put every shellfisherman out of work 
and harm the local and state economy.346 Further, if the enjoined operations 
wanted to continue they would need to develop a dredge that is more efficient 
than the current environmentally optimal version which is costly and likely 
unachievable given their resources.347 An injunction will also solidify the pa-
tent holder’s monopoly on the local dredge and shellfish market that can be 
detrimental to the public.348 There are no alternatives to the environmentally 
optimal dredge and with an injunction, the patent holder will be the sole pro-
vider which opens the door to public harm through price manipulation and the 
destruction of competition.349 
This option, if licensing or other methods of permitting use of the patent are 
unexercised, is the best course of action for commercial shell fisherman without 
                                                                                                                           
 343 See id. (discussing that an injunction will only stop the infringer from utilizing a patent in an 
industry shared with the patent holder and will not benefit the holder in any meaningful way). 
 344 See Mercexchange L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d at 586–87 (recognizing the public benefit to a 
strong patent system while discussing the public interest part of the injunction test). 
 345 See id. (holding that the public interest is best served by allowing a multi-billion dollar corpo-
ration to infringe on the patent of a two person corporation and pay monetary damages due to the 
numerous benefits the public reaps from the infringers ongoing operations). 
 346 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard to require the use of 
certain technology); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (setting forth a twenty year time period that patent protec-
tions are active until they expire and the intellectual property is released to the public); id. § 261 (stat-
ing that patents are to be treated as personal property); Mercexchange L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d at 586–
87 (allowing monetary damages to remedy infringement for the benefit of the public); EARNHART ET 
AL., supra note 260, at 36–37 (discussing the utilization of best available technology standards). 
 347 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (utilizing a best available technology standard to mandate the use 
of environmentally optimal technology); Praxair, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (discussing a situation 
where an injunction would force significant financial and operational harm to an infringer and its 
customers and favoring the infringer due to the circumstances); EARNHART ET AL., supra note 260, at 
36–37 (discussing optimal technology mandating laws); Learn About Effluent Guidelines, supra note 
30 (discussing best available technology laws and the function of the standard). 
 348 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (stating that a court reviewing an infringement action “may grant injunc-
tions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by pa-
tent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”); Acumen L.L.C., 551 F.3d at 1330–31 (holding 
that situations can arise where the public’s interest can weigh heavily in a court’s decision of whether 
to issue an injunction). 
 349 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (stating that a court has discretion in whether to issue an injunction); 
Acumen L.L.C., 551 F.3d at 1330–31 (discussing alternatives to an infringing medical device that is 
important to the welfare of the public and focusing on the public’s interest); BOURDEAU ET AL., 
supra note 213, § 1 (discussing monopolies and harm they pose to the public). 
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access to the technology.350 An award of damages will likely be an amount equal 
to a reasonable royalty that would be obtained by the patent holder if they li-
censed the technology.351 Thus, between these two options, the patent holder will 
either license the technology to its competition and profit, or be indirectly forced 
to license the technology after a court refuses to grant an injunction.352 
CONCLUSION 
By enacting a best available technology law, the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts can force the use of an environmentally optimal patent. The new 
law will force the patent holder to utilize the technology they own which will 
lead to environmental benefits such as a drop in shellfish mortality rates and 
less destruction of the environment. The law, however, will create a lawful 
monopoly for the patent holder who, overnight, will control the entire shell-
fishing industry in Massachusetts. The monopoly will not face antitrust scruti-
ny and the patent is unlikely to be misused in these circumstances. Other 
commercial shellfishing operations that do not have access to the technology 
are prevented from freely utilizing the technology because of the patent hold-
er’s intellectual property rights. Market and financial forces may lead to the 
patent holder licensing, selling, or granting access to the patent to its competi-
tors, but there is no legal force commanding this action. Any attempt to utilize 
the patent without permission will likely result in an infringement suit where 
the holder will seek an injunction to prevent the use of its technology. The 
court, however, is unlikely to grant an injunction given the circumstance of the 
situation. The elements required cannot be satisfied which will result in an 
award of damages. The amount of the award will compensate the patent holder 
appropriately and provide them with a reasonable royalty going forward. Thus, 
the patent holder has two options, license the technology or be forced to do so 
through an infringement suit resulting in a monetary award. 
This scenario can be applied to other examples where an environmentally 
optimal patent is not utilized and hidden behind patent protections. Rumors of 
an environmentally optimal dredge sparked the writing of this Note. Other ru-
mors, with varying degrees of truth, claim that patented inventions that can 
benefit the environment are purchased and locked away. Claims of oil compa-
                                                                                                                           
 350 See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (setting forth the four-part injunction test and recognizing the 
equitable discretion a court has in their issuance); supra notes 326–349 and accompanying text (argu-
ing that infringement will indirectly force the licensing of the patent). 
 351 See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (setting forth the four-part injunction test and recognizing the 
equitable discretion a court has in their issuance); supra notes 326–349 and accompanying text (argu-
ing that infringement will indirectly force the licensing of the patent). 
 352 See eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (setting forth the four-part injunction test and recognizing the 
equitable discretion a court has in their issuance); supra notes 326–349 and accompanying text (argu-
ing that infringement will indirectly force the licensing of the patent). 
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nies purchasing clean technology to protect its interests or medical companies 
hiding advanced treatment methods to sustain its profits are widespread. If 
technology of this kind exists and the patent is located, the argument set forth 
in this Note is one way to bring its benefits to the public. 
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